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INTRODUCTION 
Provisions for evaluative research to aid decision making have been 
included in each act dealing with occupational training and retraining 
since the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 allowed for research, "to assist 
in the long-range accomplishment of the purposes of this Act The 
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 provided that the Secretary 
of Labor shall "arrange, through grants or contracts, for the conduct of 
such research and investigations as give promise of furthering the objec-
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tives of this Act." 
Subsequent amendments to the Manpower Development and Training Act 
(MDTA) have strengthened the provisions for evaluative research to be 
performed by persons inside the Department of Labor and through contracts 
and grants to persons and institutions outside of the Department. 
Under provisions of the MDTA, Economic Opportunity Act (EGA), and 
Social Security Act (SSA), the Office of Manpower Research in the Manpower 
Administration of the Department of Labor develops and administers research 
programs "to guide and help perfect programs for better utilization of the 
country's manpower resources." 
Ip.L. 87-27, May 1, 1961, 75 Stat. 47: 72 Stat. 697; 42 U.S.C. 2501-
2525 Sec. 2523. 
^P.L. 87-415, Mar. 15, 1962, 76 Stat. 23, as amended by (a) P.L. 87-
729, Oct. 1, 1962, 76 Stat. 679, (b) P.L. 88-214, Dec. 19, 1963, 77 Stat. 
422, (c) P.L. 89-15, Apr. 26, 1965, 79 Stat. 75, (d) P.L. 89-792, Nov. 7, 
1966, 80 Stat. 1434, (e) P.L. 89-794, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1451, and (f) 
P.L. 90-636, Oct. 24, 1968, 82 Stat. 1352; 42 U.S;C. 2571-2628 Sec. 102, 
(5). 
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U.S. Department of Labor. Manpower Administration. Manpower research 
projects. 1969. P. 1. 
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The early effort of the Department of Labor under the research mandate 
of Title I of the MDTA was to develop an integrated program for future 
research. The purpose of benefit-cost analysis was to provide an authori­
tative answer to the net value of training and retraining programs. "In 
the past these programs have been justified because of their social and 
economic contributions, but a measure of these contributions weighed 
1 
against their costs has not been available." Throughout the I960's 
benefits-cost analysis was cast as an assessment of the "importance of 
training and retraining programs as a tool in improving our manpower 
resources.... That there are economic benefits from training is an 
assumption generally accepted, but there has been little pragmatic evidence 
2 
to document this hypothesis." 
Consistent with this continued demand for information into the 
decision-making process, there have been numerous benefit-cost studies of 
AEA and MDTA programs. The methodologies of these studies have varied 
considerably. Because of this confusion of approaches, several recent 
attempts have been made to synthesize or at least reconcile the meth­
odologies. This thesis continues that endeavor. 
The following chapter presents the integral parts of benefit-cost 
analysis as a logical stepwise approach to provide a framework for gathering 
quantitative information for decision making. It examines the nature of the 
^U.S. Department of Labor. Report of the Secretary of Labor on 
research and training activities under the MDTA. 1963. P. 93. 
2 U.S. Department of Labor. Report of the Secretary of Labor on 
research and training activities under the MDTA. 1964. P. 96. 
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method from project delineation through general decision rule formulation. 
The latter part of this chapter introduces measurement methodology as a 
subsidiary of the analysis process. The analysis for MDTA programs supple­
ments the chapter as an appendix. 
The third chapter begins with an assessment of data sources for the 
quantitative analysis of MDTA programs. It then explores the measurement 
process in depth contrasting the approaches toward quantification of 
effects streams. It emphasizes that the difficulties attendant the 
measurement of program effects remain regardless of approach methodology. 
The fourth chapter explores an alternative to the use of benefit-cost 
analysis for decision-making. This method relies upon quantification of 
program effects to a lesser extent than does benefit-cost analysis. The 
last part of the chapter takes as given that it has been possible to 
accurately assess the quantitative magnitudes of alternative activities. 
The benefit-cost and linear programming allocative approaches are compared 
and found to evolve to a single allocative rule. 
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THE BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
This chapter defines the problem confronting a benefit-cost analyst 
and examines the method with which the analyst conducts an analysis. The 
text of the chapter explores benefit-cost analysis in general with examples 
specific to manpower training program evaluation. The appendix to this 
chapter specifies the approach for two MDTA programs. 
The purpose of benefit-cost analysis is to aid the decision making 
process. It can be used alone or in conjunction with other data to provide 
a framework within which to view the consequences of a particular action 
and/or inaction. It's general methodology is straightforward. A contem­
plated action or inaction will induce a chain of causal effects in the 
components of the social system. The first step is to define the problem 
confronting the analyst. The second step of benefit-cost analysis is to 
determine the stream of effects generated by action and the alternative 
stream of effects generated by inaction. These effects streams have at 
least two dimensions: magnitudes measured in units of their own variates 
and magnitudes measured in time. As a third step, benefit-cost analysis 
attempts to find a common denominator for the effects streams. Finally, 
a decision rule with which to value the action and inaction consequences 
is postulated and utilized. The conceptual and theoretical difficulties 
inherent in the analysis process are herein treated step by step. The 
chapter concludes with an introduction into the problems of effects 
measurement which are taken up in depth in the third chapter. 
Definition of the Benefit-Cost Problem 
Envision a dynamic social system stopped at a point in time. When 
time is allowed to run once again the social system may move along one of 
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several paths. One of these paths would be taken due to social and eco­
nomic forces already in motion prior to the instant time was stopped. The 
other societal time paths evolve if concerted actions are taken on the 
part of a decision maker or decision makers to change the nature of some 
of the economic and social structural relationships or the magnitude of 
the variables involved in the structural relationships. The problem faced 
by the decision maker is to choose that alternative, be it inaction (no 
concerted effort) or action (a particular concerted effort or efforts), 
which will move society to the highest level of social welfare presented 
by those alternatives over the decision maker's time horizon. 
The economists' role in this decision making process is defined by the 
decision maker. As benefit-cost analyst, the role is generally that of a 
provider of information into the decision-making process. The information 
consists of the economic effects (changes in economic structural relation­
ships and the magnitude of economic variables), which would result from 
adopting each of the alternative paths confronting society. These economic 
effects are an integral, small subset of the total social effects. This 
subset is not clearly defined, however, nor is the structural fabric of 
the social system known. The information an economist can provide about 
the economic effects of alternative social paths is constrained by the 
analytical state of his discipline. It is further constrained by the less 
than perfect data set which the analyst must use to divine the types and 
magnitudes of economic change. Finally, the analyst is limited by his own 
personal ability to use his discipline. 
With these limitations upon the role of the economist as information 
provider acknowledged and taken as given, the next step is to illustrate 
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the information gathering procedure. It is essentially a three part 
process. The alternative pathways must in sorte way be delineated. The 
economic effects of undertaking each must be determined. And finally, the 
alternatives must be placed on a basis for comparison over the time horizon 
of the decision maker, i.e., effectively an economic welfare function must 
be formulated and used for each alternative. 
The Delineation of Societal Alternatives 
What appear to be alternative pathways at the aggregate societal level 
take on the qualities of labyrinths at the micro level. To explain this 
it is first necessary to define activities, projects, and effects. Then 
the analysis will be illustrated utilizing MDTA programs. 
Activities are concerted actions or bundles of concerted actions that 
produce changes in the magnitudes of specified social system variables. 
As such they are of the nature of a process. Like production processes 
activities may be differentiated by the set of variables they are intended 
to affect and by the relative proportions of variable change they require 
within the set of affected variables. An activity might be operated along 
a continuum from zero to some capacity level. 
A project is defined to be a particular level of operation for an 
activity. In general the data limitations constrain the analysis of an 
activity to discrete levels of operation. An activity is then a series of 
projects. 
Effects are all the changes in the relationships and magnitudes of 
variables in the social system that result from an activity. Direct 
effects are those changes in the specific system phenomena that result 
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immediately from project activities. Indirect effects stem from the direct 
effects. Thus, associated with each project (activity level) there is a 
stream of effects which is both direct and indirect in nature. 
At the societal level one may view an alternative pathway to be the 
production of an output by a production process (activity). Upon closer 
inspection there may be more "than one process involved and these processes 
may be interrelated in numerous ways to yield a multitude of alternatives. 
The benefit-cost analyst must delineate the separate initial activities, 
the possible hybrid activities, reasonable projects for all activities and 
the effects streams resultant for each project. 
Take as an abstract example two production process activities. For 
each activity taken individually the effects streams can be delineated for 
each level of operation (project). These streams can then be compared to 
the stream of effects expected to occur if the activity were operated at 
the zero level, i.e., against the alternative that the social pathway of 
"no action" was taken. Utilizing the "no action" as a standard for 
comparison, the two activities can then be compared with each other. 
Suppose that the two production processes are to be run simultaneously. 
If the running of one process does not affect the operation of the other, 
the activities are independent. This might be the situation if each used 
different inputs. If, on the other hand, they utilized the same inputs the 
operation of one activity may preclude the operation of the other and the 
relationship is termed mutually exclusive. It may be that simultaneous 
operation of one activity does not preclude the operation of the other, but 
that the effects stream of one or both is altered by the presence of the 
other. The activities may be merged to a point in the production process 
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and then diverge. The relationship is one of interdependence at a level 
less than, mutual exclusivity. 
Illustration of the Concepts Utilizing MDTA Activities 
At the macro level the alternative to no action is training under the 
Manpower Development and Training Act. The decision maker must elect one 
or the other. As information source the benefit-cost analyst must answer 
a number of basic questions: 
1. What basic activities are included in the "training under the 
MDTA" alternative? 
2. How are these activities best delineated? 
3. What possibilities for hybrid activities exist? 
4. How are they related? 
5. What are reasonable projects for each activity? 
6. What qualitative and quantitative effects streams are generated 
by each project? 
7. How does each project compare with the "no action" alternative? 
8. What common denominator can be used to compare project effects 
streams within an activity? Among activities? 
9. Which project (activity and level of activity) or combination of 
projects (activities and activity levels) maximize the change in the common 
denominator? 
Having obtained this information from the analyst, the decision maker must 
weigh it against other societal information to select the most socially 
optimal alternative path. If the MDTA alternative is chosen, the micro 
requirements of the training activity have been specified by the information 
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gathering process undertaken by the analyst. 
This section is concerned with answers to questions one through five. 
The next section on effects treats six and seven, and the decision rule 
section deals with questions eight and nine. 
The two basic activities under the MDTA are on-the-job training (OJT) 
and institutional training (IT). OJT is "over-the-shoulder" training at 
the job site. Institutional training on the other hand is primarily a 
classroom training situation. Coupled training (CT) consists of a class­
room training prelude to OJT. As such it combines aspects of both OJT and 
IT and can be considered to be a hybrid activity. 
At the micro level, the specification of activities is a more diffi­
cult task. Activities might be differentiated by output, input, and/or 
location. For example, national OJT, IT, and CT might be decomposed into 
activities by: (1) Occupation, (2) Trainee characteristics, (3) Geographi­
cal region, or (4) Labor market (or Functional Economic Area). 
Project levels would be delineated by common denominator output levels 
or levels of input. 
One might argue that projects be uniform across activities and that 
the common denominator be one which measures the magnitude of the diversion 
of societal resources to that level of activity operation. The establish­
ment of other than uniform projeci; levels does not render the analysis 
meaningless. The decision rule should indicate the most optimal project 
for each activity from the effects streams of the projects regardless of 
the manner by which activity levels are designated. 
Suppose projects are delineated by number of persons entering the 
activity. Nu«..crous study designs become obvious. Two possibilities are 
shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
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Table 1. Benefit-cost study design A 
Projects^ 
Activity 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 ... 50,000 
OJT ESq^ GSoiS ^^020 ^^050 
^^15 ^^110 ^^115 ^^120 ^^150 
CT BScs EScx, ESci, ESg^ ES C50 
%umber of persons entering training. 
^Effects streams resulting from each project. 
Two important considerations in the selection of activity levels are 
the availability and form of information and the policy question the 
analysis is intended to answer. 
Comprehensive data are often difficult to obtain for manpower programs. 
This is particularly true for evaluations conducted on a nationwide basis. 
Data on the effects of training programs on the rest of society by the 
nature of it is improvised and inexact. Comprehensive data which allow 
comprehensive activities levels are most frequently collected at the 
individual project level of analysis utilizing interview techniques. For 
example, as we shall see in the next chapter, one would be hindered in the 
establishment of national activity levels based upon trainee prior work 
histories because they are often neither available nor accurate. 
A policy decision may require information only on macro level 
activities (rightly or wrongly) or be relegated to macro activities by the 
available information. For example, one might ask if there were a nonzero 
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Table 2. Benefit-cost study design B 
OJT 
IT 
Projects* 
Activity 500 1,000 5,000 ... 50,000 
Operative 
Sewing machine operator 
Maintenance man 
Farm laborer 
Nurse's aide 
Operative 
Mechanic 
Auto body man 
Draftsman 
Operative 
Nurse's aide 
Maintenance man 
CT 
Key punch operator 
dumber of persons entering training for each occupation by training 
activity. 
^Each project cell indicates the effects streams for undertaking a 
particular type of training for the listed occupation. 
national optimal mix of OJT and IT activities disregarding training occupa­
tions. This suggests activity design A in Table 1. Or the policy decision 
may call for an occupational training analysis to determine the optimal mix 
of occupations by type of training which is design B of Table 2. However, 
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insufficient data may force one from design B to design A. The information 
is still deficient but this is masked by the scale of the study. Thus, 
much less specific and less useful policy prescriptions can be made because 
the lumping together of micro activities adds less optimal with more optimal 
projects. The number of project combinations to be examined declines. For 
instance, if the information allowed design B above, optimal training 
combinations may call for OJT for nurse's aides, IT for mechanics, and the 
discarding of OJT for the training of farm laborers which IT did not have 
in the first place. In design A this fine of an information distinction is 
impossible, and for OJT the effects of training nurse's aides must be 
lumped with the effects of training mechanics and farm laborers. 
The activity hierarchical level in part determines the types of rela­
tionships between projects. At the national level the activities are inde­
pendent if OJT projects streams are not affected by the presence of IT 
projects and vice versa. In other words, a study of a 30,000 trainee IT 
project is not affected by the presence of a 10,000 trainee OJT project. 
They are interdependent if the effects streams for one or both would 
or could be changed by concurrent projects: 
a. would—external effects to one from the other; 
b. could—could purposefully set up a joint project to change the 
effects streams. 
They are mutually exclusive if the effects stream of one is totally 
precluded by use of the other. For example, if a 100,000 trainee IT 
program exhausted the supply of potential trainees. The alternatives are 
a 100,000 IT project or a 100,000 OJT project, but not both. 
The top level activities are probably interdependent, or are at least 
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potentially so considering such things as joint administration. Theoreti­
cally they could be independent or a policy decision could require them to 
be mutually exclusive activities. 
In design B so long as joint administration is not involved, training 
activities not duplicated between top levels are probably independent. 
Thus, OJT training of farm laborers would be independent of institutional 
activities because there is no institutional training of farm laborers. 
Where duplicate training activities do exist, they could be independent, 
interdependent, or mutually exclusive under the same considerations as for 
macro level activities. 
Definition of Effects 
The project effects are the magnitudes that did or would be expected 
to exist in the totality of phenomena as a result of the project. Two 
questions are asked in the analysis of these effects. I'fhat qualitative 
and quantitative effects streams are generated by each project? How does 
each project compare with the "no action" alternative? This represents a 
strictly with-without situation complete with philosophical connotations 
and uncertainties. 
The phenomena are classed as variables. A causal system of these 
variables exists as a social system. Training activities cause disturbances 
in eoir.a v.-.riables and these cause other variables to change. The answer to 
the first question requires the analyst to discern the magnitudes of the 
social system variables after the training project has been added to the 
causal system for society. The second question asks the analyst to measure 
the differential that exists in the magnitude of system variables with the 
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project as opposed to the system variable magnitudes without the project. 
Here the information is a time series of differentials in system variables 
not a time series of variable magnitudes. The significance of this will 
be discussed at the decision rule step. 
The effects themselves have been classified in several ways. The 
types of effects classifications overlap. The major classes distinguish 
between direct-indirect effects, primary-secondary effects, and internal-
external effects. 
Direct effects are those changes in variables that result immediately 
from project activities - the disturbances. Thus, for training activities 
changes in skill and attitudes are direct effects. Indirect effects are 
those variable magnitudes that result from being causally related to the 
variables directly affected. For example, levels of employment and earned 
income might be indirect effects for a training activity. However, the 
distinction is a difficult one to make because skill acquisition probably 
interacts causally with attitudes toward employment. 
Primary effects are magnitudes of variables which the project was 
designed to affect and which have a social welfare connotation. They are 
the sorts of variables that planning-programming-budget studies would 
select as "goal" variants. For example, trainee earned income and employ­
ment attitudes are often termed "target" variables for training projects. 
Secondary effects are magnitudes of non-target variables such as skill. 
This distinction also causes confusion in analyses because it revolves 
about the distinction between means and ends. Thus for an activity the 
means of achieving the end of earned income may be skill acquisition. One 
might, however, see skill acquisition as an end in itself and class it as 
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a primary effect. 
These two effects classifications overlap. The direct-indirect 
distinction relates to causal ordering. The primary-secondary distinction 
relates to ends and means. If an activity has a direct effect of skill 
acquisition and indirect effects of increased employment and earnings, 
skill acquisition could be either a primary or secondary effect depending 
upon its end or means designation. 
The final distinction is made on the basis of agent or person 
incidence. Internal effects are variable magnitudes incurred by the 
persons in the social system the project was designed to affect. External 
effects impinge upon agencies other than the one sponsoring the project or 
persons other than those for whom the project was intended. These do not 
have a direct feedback effect.upon the projects' initiators or intended 
recipients. Externalities fall into two categories. Technological exter­
nalities are effects that change the production possibilities of producer's 
inputs and/or the satisfaction available from consumer inputs. Pecuniary 
externalities are effects that stem from changes in the prices of inputs 
and outputs as a result of the project. 
By way of example, technological externalities for a training project 
would accrue should there be a demonstration effect associated with project 
trainees. An external technological benefit would occur if a trainee's 
positive experience with employment encouraged his family to become more 
productive workers. An external cost would be associated with training if 
special managerial aid to the trainee during his period of initial work 
transition were interpreted by other workers as favoritism and this 
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declining morale decreased productivity.^ 
Should the increased supply of trainees for a particular occupation 
depress wages or the rate of wage increases, pecuniary externalities have 
been exhibited. Thus, it should be clear that technological externalities 
involve both efficiency and equity considerations and that pecuniary 
externalities are problems of equity. 
It is clear that internal effects could be direct, indirect, primary 
or secondary. External effects are probably indirect but could be primary 
or secondary in nature. From the societal viewpoint there are no exter­
nalities (true if the analysts disregards impact upon the rest of the 
world) involved in the initiation of a project. But from the viewpoint of 
the project there are externalities. 
There are three levels of knowledge concerning variables: concep­
tualization, definition, and measurement, e.g., (1) employment, (2) engaging 
in the production process, (3) manhours worked. There are also three levels 
of knowledge concerning relationships between variables: existence, 
direction, and magnitude, e.g., (1) a relationship exists between employment 
and output, (2) when employment increases output increases, (3) when employ­
ment increases by one manhour, output increases by $10. 
If there were perfect knowledge the analyst's problem would be easy, 
for he would know all the consequences (effects) of a performed or 
speculated action. But there is not perfect information, so the analyst 
must in some way determine a priori or ex post the variables affected by an 
^Glen C. Cain and Robinson G. Hollister. The methodology of evaluating 
social action programs. Discussion Papers. Madison, Wisconsin, Institute 
for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin. 1969. P. 34. 
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Table 3. Illustrative variable set 
Number Variable 
0 Utility 
1 Employment 
2 Unemployment (structural, insufficient aggregate 
demand) 
3 Underemployment (structural, insufficient aggregate 
demand) 
4 Skill 
5 Education 
6 Income (output) 
7 Transfer payments 
8 Growth 
9 Inflation 
10 Crime 
11 Pertinent psychological variables (self-esteem) 
12 Pertinent sociological variables (family cohesiveness) 
13 Pertinent political variables (participation) 
Utility is the master variable. Could one but define, measure and 
interpersonally relate utility, the search for the optimal path would be 
within reach. But the concept has not proven satisfactorily definable, 
raeasureable, or interpersonally relatable. Thus, in the absence of this, 
one utilizes other variables as indicators of personal and social utility. 
Employment may be defined as engagement in the process of production 
or utilization of skill and education in the process of production. 
Measures for employment include, at the aggregate level, number of persons 
employed at a particular time or over time, manhours of input per standard 
time period, or percentage of the labor force employed. At the level of 
19 
the individual, measures of employment include manhours per standard time 
period or percentage of standard time period employed. 
The measures for individual variables have own-unit magnitudes and a 
magnitude common to all other variables: time. Up until now, the temporal 
aspects of the analysis have not been dealt with extensively. They enter 
in two major ways; (1) the span of time over which a project's effects 
stream diverges from effects without the project, and (2) the comparison of 
time streams to indicate differences over time. 
In the absence of an omnipotent planner utilizing perfect information, 
analysts proceed by assumption and study. Theoretically, project effects 
could last indefinitely. Whether they last indefinitely or not, they are 
treated in such a manner in most studies that they approach a limiting 
value. Or they are limited to the decision maker's time horizon. Finite 
and infinite streams are examined below. 
In order for there to be a finite effects horizon, the effects 
stemming from the project must at a point be zero for both trainees and 
the rest of society. They converge to the "no action" variable magnitudes. 
Or they must be negligible, e.g. a one shot multiplier effect after a 
considerable time has passed. For example, with respect to the effects of 
training projects on trainees, one must assume to reach a horizon, that 
over time trainees return to the position they were in before training or 
to the position they would have received had there been no project. In 
other words, that any employment or earnings differential dissipates as do 
skill increases, educational increases, etc. How great a possibility this 
is depends upon the extent to which the trainee was helped or hindered 
during training and the subsequent exogenous post-training influences. If 
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eventually all trainees end up in jobs that were not the result of any 
aspect of training, then the employment and earnings effect approaches zero 
at some finite point in time. A finite horizon has been reached. 
If the horizon is infinite, the effects of the training project must 
continue indefinitely into the future or one might limit infinity to those 
effects streams that exist after the decision maker's horizon. This is 
just as likely to happen as is the other instance. It would seem difficult 
to believe that training had no lasting effects. If there is any truth to 
the saying "like father, like son" there are potential second generation 
effects both positive and negative in nature. Whether or not the time 
horizon is finite or infinite will be settled empirically. Two such 
studies conclude the effects of projects may hold over a considerable 
1 • 
length of time. The form of time streams specification is intimately 
related to decision rule input requirements. A decision rule could utilize 
time streams knowledge in several ways. It could (1) use the time streams 
themselves as they occur, (2) use stream differentials over time, or (3) 
put the effects on a single time basis. The ideal decision rule would 
utilize the effects streams themselves as inputs in the final form. Pre­
sentation of project effects in this first form presumes the decision 
rule can distinguish between these time streams. As projects increase in 
number, the ability of a decision rule to so distinguish must take on a 
Michael 1Î. Borus. Time trends in benefits from retraining in 
Connecticut. Industrial Relations Research Association Proceedings 20: 
36-46. 1967. William J. Swift and Burton A. Weisbrod. On the monetary 
value of education's intergeneration effects. Journal of Political Economy 
73: 643-649. 1965. 
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superhuman quality. Thus a simplification should be made to achieve a 
more compact input data set that gives, without distortion, the same amount 
of information as do the time streams. The concern here lies solely with 
the nondistorted presentation of the effects and the meaning of such a 
presentation. The analyst is not yet judging the effects streams. The 
task is to collapse the effects data into fewer values without biasing 
them. 
Assume the analyst knows all of the magnitudes of all the variables 
for the effects stream with a project and without it. The intertemporal 
structure of the effects streams will probably differ for some or all of 
the variables. The problem is to put the variables in each effects stream 
on equal footing for comparison purposes. The method for doing so is to 
transform each variable's time stream into its present value utilizing a 
rate of social time preference to discount the variable time streams. 
Simply put, social time preference is the concept that society distinguishes 
social values on the basis of time. Thus given a societal choice between a 
variable magnitude today and the same magnitude next year, society values 
the present magnitude more highly than the future one. Or to put it in 
another way, for society to prefer the future magnitude, its level must be 
raised relative to the present magnitude. The social rate of time prefer­
ence is that percentage increase in the future magnitude that must be made 
over the present variable magnitude to make society indifferent between the 
two magnitudes. 
In order to utilize this concept two questions must be answered: 
1. What rate should be used? 
2. What variables can it be used for? 
22 
The proper rate has been the subject of much discussion.^ If an 
activity affects a set of variables that is a subset of the total society 
and if the rate of time preference is to be used in a comparison of this 
subset stream of effects with the subset stream without the project, then 
two types of bias can enter the comparison. Assuming that the decision 
maker's selection of an action alternative over the inaction alternative 
occasions a transfer of resources from private to social usage, the mix of 
private and social resource use and the level of resource use will be 
affected by the choice of the social discount rate. A discount rate that 
is lower than the private opportunity cost rate of the inaction stream 
overvalues the action stream effects and consequently too high an activity 
level may be selected. Thus the mix of private and social resource use is 
monoptimally altered. On the other hand, utilization of a higher rate to 
reflect private opportunity cost of resource allocation may make the total 
level of resource use too small, i.e., the mix may be optimal, but both 
social and private resource use may be too small. Here other activity 
streams would enter the analysis. 
2 
Using Musgrave's prescriptions these alternatives would be streams of 
effects stemming from alternative private and public resource mixes after 
See for instance William J. Baumol. On the social rate of discount. 
American Economic Review 58: 788-802. 19^8. Comments follow by Alan 
Nichols, Estelle James, David Ramsey, Dan Usher, and William J. Baumol in 
AER 59: 909-930. 1969. See also Richard A. Musgrave. Cost-benefit 
analysis and the theory of public finance. Journal of Economic Literature 
7: 797-806. 1969. 
2 
Musgrave, 0£. cit., pp. 801-802. 
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fiscal and monetary policy had been used to equalize the rates of return 
on private and public resource use. If this last approach is accepted as 
theoretically sound, it is very nearly operationally impossible. Instead, 
the approach generally adopted (and that which is very nearly the consensus 
of the AER writers mentioned before) is one of "second best." The opera­
tional discount rate lies between five and ten percent and is preferably 
at the higher end of that range. 
Although use of the discount rate has been entirely confined to 
magnitudes expressed in pecuniary units, it need not be so limited. There 
is no reason one could not take a time stream or streams differential of 
nonpecuniary magnitudes and perform the discounting methodology to arrive at 
a present value number. To do so is to assert that society potentially 
values an effect in and of itself. The significance of this will be 
explored in the following section on the decision rule. At this point the 
analyst seeks a collapsed indicator of intertemporal variable magnitudes. 
The discounted value of variables could serve such a use. For example, one 
could discount a flow of employment of forty hours a week one year from now 
at the rate of ten percent. Or, if under one project an individual would 
be employed twenty hours a week for five years and under another project 
forty hours over ten years, both streams could be discounted to present 
value hours of employment. 
The Decision Rule 
Up to this point the analysis has not overtly considered an effect to 
have a positive or negative social welfare connotation. The concern has 
been with the derivation of a set of variables that show the major part of 
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the effects streams with and without a project. The impetus of this 
section is the derivation of a means by which the effects streams of the 
projects can be judged and the optimal stream chosen. The questions 
relating to these tasks have been stated earlier. What common denominator 
can be used to compare project effects streams within activities? Between 
activities? Which project (activity and level of activity) or combination 
of projects (activities and activity levels) maximizes the change in the 
common denominator? None of the variables are yet costs or benefits to 
society; they are just variables. At this point, however, there are costs 
v'ithout welfare connotations. These are the opportunity costs associated 
with the selection of an effects stream. The opportunity cost of choosing 
one stream in a with-without project analysis format is the foregone 
stream. 
An analyst unwilling to leave the realm of positivism would end the 
analysis at this point. He would present the impact upon the system with 
the project and the impact without it. It would be up to the decision 
maker to decide among the streams of variable changes. The decision rule 
could vary from the implicit and subjective (pork barrel, log rolling) to 
the explicit and objective. The decision maker may elect not to use the 
positivist's contribution toward the decision if it is felt: (a) that 
variables other than those specified are of importance in the determination 
of effects streams, or (b) that the analysis is faulty for the specified 
variables. 
If the analyst is to do more, then he must specify a form of economic 
or social welfare function. The fact that economists have been unable to 
derive a theoretically satisfactory social welfare function has not, of 
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course, prevented decisions from being made. The transition from theory 
to operationalism is hampered by many pitfalls even for a conclusive 
theory. The foundation for operationalism is further eroded and the , 
operational conclusions are even more susceptible to valid criticism if 
the theory is inconclusive. In the face of this, the analysis herein 
suggests several possible decision rule approaches with varying degrees of 
theoretical abuse. 
For purposes of derivation, assume that the analyst is to decide the 
optimal stream. It is incumbent upon him to show that the project he 
picks represents a social state superior to other alternative pathways. Or, 
if the analyst disagrees with a decision rule, it is his burden to develop 
a better one. Theoretically, in the absence of a social welfare function 
one must show that the utility-feasibility function of the society has 
everywhere moved outward to prove a "potentially" superior welfare situa­
tion. If one assumes the existence of a social welfare function (SWF), then 
it is sufficient to show that one effects stream results in a higher value 
of social welfare. This is true whether or not the social choice mechanism 
maximizes a social welfare function. The analyst must be about the business 
of divining such a SWF. (Or he may take on the no less Herculean task of 
estimating an economic welfare function.) In so doing the analyst con­
structs his perception of society's welfare function. What follows is an 
explicit derivation of several social welfare function approaches to the 
problem of choosing an optimal stream of effects. 
A general SWF would encompass all variables in the system and all 
persons. In the analytic situation of benefit-cost analysis one is working 
cognizantly with a small subset of those variables and with a specific set 
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of persons directly affected by the projects. Hopefully the external 
effects will also be known. 
The SWF becomes the analyst's decision rule with which to judge the 
postulated societal states that result from the effects streams of activi­
ties. As a first step, the analyst has knowledge of what he considers to 
be the major variables affected by the project. Secondly, he must specify 
how changes in these variables affect the SWF. This specification is made 
at the operational level. The theory and common sense both allow one to 
argue direct and inverse relationships between changes in variables and the 
SWF. One could, in part, rely upon legislative specifications to judge the 
relationships between variables and Congress's view of social welfare.^ 
This raises problems of contradiction and fluidity of specification, let 
alone the vast volume of legislation and court modification to be digested 
in such an approach. Utilizing the specifications of a single law is no 
less tenuous due to the specificity of groups with which much legislation 
is concerned and the funding variations over time. The MDTA as a case in 
point has always dealt directly with a small, defined portion of society, 
not the whole of society, has had various levels of funding, has been 
modified operationally, and allows ambiguous determinations of intent. 
Thus the law provides tenuous clues to the variables-SWF relationships. 
What must emerge from an attempt to specify an operational SWF is a 
Burton Weisbrod has presented an interesting approach to the problem 
by using Congressional project funding effects upon groups within the 
economy to devise a hypothetical set of weights for a SWF. Burton A. 
Weisbrod. Income redistribution effects and benefit-cost analysis. In 
Chase, Samuel B., Jr., ed. Problems in public expenditure analysis. 
Pp. 177-209. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution. 1968. 
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conglomeration of economic theory, interpretation of legislative intent, 
and personal values. It is an open question whether a benefit-cost 
analyst's specifications are better than those of any other decision maker. 
Thus the decision rule, the analyst's or another decision maker's, should 
be explicit and backed by explicit reasoning. Table 4 below presents a set 
of possible variables-SWF relationships and is followed by its attendant 
logic for income. The logic in support of the other variables is provided 
in Appendix A. 
Table 4. Variable-social T/elfare function relationships 
Direction of relationship 
Inverse 
Inverse 
Direct 
Direct 
Direct 
Inverse 
Direct 
Inverse 
Inverse 
Direct 
Direct 
Direct 
Variable 
Employment 
Underemployment 
Skill 
Education 
Income 
Transfer payments 
Growth 
Inflation 
Crime 
Psychological variables; 
Self-esteem 
Sociological variables: 
Family cohesiveness 
Political variables: 
Participation 
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The question is posed: if there is a change in one variable ceteris 
paribus, does social welfare vary directly, inversely, or not at all with 
the variable change? The same question is asked for the individual with 
respect to individual welfare. To put the question another way, if in 
examining two social states that are exactly alike in all respects except 
that in one VARIABLE is of greater magnitude for at least one person, then 
social welfare is higher (lower). The relationship is then a(n) direct 
(inverse) one. And, if in examining two social states they are exactly 
alike in all respects except that in one VARIABLE is of greater magnitude 
for an individual, then that individual's welfare is higher (lower) and 
the relationship is a direct (inverse) one. The purpose here is only to 
specify the direction of the relationship. If in examining two social 
states that are exactly alike in all respects except that in one income 
is at a higher level for at least one person, then social welfare is higher. 
The relationship is then a direct one. The same holds for the welfare of 
an individual. 
Part of the problem of specifying such relationships comes from 
attempting to separate direct utility effects from indirect utility 
effects. Thus, for example, does employment have any direct effect posi­
tively, or negatively upon utility or is it just associated indirectly 
because one associates an increased income with increased employment? If 
in fact one looks solely at the direct effect of employment upon utility 
then one may make an assumption as to whether employment for employment 
sake is inversely related to utility. 
Take as given some specification of the variables-SWF relationships 
(however it may be specified). One can devise from this a very weak 
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decision rule. A stream of effects (levels of variables) can be said to 
cause unambiguously a positive (negative) change in the social welfare if 
the variables Inversely related to social welfare decrease (increase) and 
those directly related increase (decrease). However, at the very minimum 
one must consider two effects streams. The weak decision rule developed 
here allows an unambiguous choice in three situations. 
1. Both streams unambiguously increase social welfare and affect the 
same variables. An effects stream may be chosen so long as at least one 
of its variable effects exceeds that of the other stream and none others 
are smaller. 
2. Both streams unambiguously decrease social welfare and affect the 
same variables. An effects stream may be chosen so long as at least one 
of its effects is smaller than the value of the effect in the other stream 
and none are larger than the other stream's effects. 
3. All streams affect social welfare unambiguously negatively except 
for one stream which has an unambiguously positive effects stream. 
The two streams of effects at the very least would consist of the 
stream with a project and the stream without it. Rather than utilize both 
streams of variable magnitudes one would probably use stream differences. 
The without-the-project or no-action effects stream magnitudes are 
subtracted from the with-the-preject variables magnitudes as opportunity 
costs. The stream differentials are then used as input into the decision 
rule. 
If one is to choose between streams that have characteristics other 
than those specified above, then some means of weighting the changes in 
variables must be used. For example, consider two streams that differ only 
30 
in the magnitude of two variables; skill and income. Stream one's sole 
effects are an income increase of six and a skill increase of two. Stream 
two has an income increase of five and a skill increase of three and not 
any other effects. The weak decision rule stipulated above allows no 
choice to be made. A decision can be made if weights are attached to the 
variables. 
There are several possible ways to accomplish a weighting. As soon 
as one has specified a trade-off between changes in variables, one has 
specified a weighting. This is, in effect, the arriving at of a common 
denominator and a magnitude indicator for welfare. For example, if one 
establishes that the trade-off between a one unit employment change and 
a transfer payments change of one unit is two (i.e. a change in employment 
of one manhour is valued at twice that of a $2 (one unit) change in transfer 
payments), then the conmon denominator could be social welfare measured in 
manhours or dollars of transfer payments and the marginal rate of substitu­
tion between employment and income is two. Assuming the weighting to be 
constant specifies a single marginal rate of substitution to hold for 
changes in variables. 
One may, as another approach, choose to weight various of the variables 
at zero value (e.g. employment). Thus, one might assume income changes to 
be the sole relevant indicator of social welfare, i.e., regardless of other 
variables changes, if one effects stream has the largest change in income 
then that stream is optimal. Or, more palatably, the changes in other 
variables are assumed to move at least proportionately with income such 
that higher income levels also indicate higher levels of change in other 
variables and a subsequently larger amount of social welfare. 
31 
Another method involves the use of a proxy for social utility which 
becomes a common denominator. These proxies need only vary up to a 
monotonie transformation with social welfare. The most widely used common 
denominator is the unit of exchange. If perfect competition prevails, 
there are ro externalities, no social goods, etc., then the market price 
is the value placed by society upon an input or output variable and is also 
the private valuation. In order to use the unit of exchange as a common 
denominator one must have a market for each variable or be able to impute 
one. In other words, if possible it would be ideal to view all changes 
Impinging upon society as though they were acting through a market. If 
there is no market for the variable as an input or an output, a value must 
be imputed. This can be done by imputing a demand and a supply curve. 
Then a shift in demand or supply leads to a change in consumer's surplus 
and/or producer's surplus. The net variation in terms of units of exchange 
indicates utility change. If one of the variables is an input, then its 
value is imputed by its derived demand from the final goods market and the 
input supply. All variables must be valued in the unit of exchange. This 
approach has been used for MDTÂ activities and variables as illustrated in 
Appendix A. 
For certain of the variables, use of the unit of exchange as a common 
denominator underestimates the utility change associated with a change in 
variable magnitude. For example, income itself is already in terms of the 
unit of exchange. However, utility in the form of prestige may attach to 
income in and of itself over and above the utility of the consumption of 
goods and services inherent in income. Table 5 summarizes the use of the 
unit of exchange common denominator. 
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Table 5. Potential unit of exchange valuation and bias 
Variable Valuation Bias 
Employment Directly in income 
Underemployment Directly in income 
Skill None Underestimate 
Education None Underestimate 
Income Directly Underestimate 
Transfer payments Indirectly in income 
Growth Indirectly in income Underestimate 
Inflation None Underestimate 
Crime • None Underestimate 
Self-esteem Indirectly in income Underestimate 
Family cohesiveness Indirectly in income 
Participation None Underestimate 
All of the changes in variables that can be put into the unit of 
exchange common denominator have been transformed. One might assume the 
unit of exchange uniformly proxies for social welfare, e.g. that a single 
unit of exchange due to employment change is valued equally with a single 
unit of exchange due to income change. The total of such changes positive 
and negative yields a unit of exchange index of change in social welfare. 
One could choose between streams on the basis of the relative magnitudes of 
the index. But this may become a partial decision rule. One might add, as 
Roland McKean suggests,^ a separate exhibit of those effects not shown by 
the common denominator index. But what weighting should be used? The 
^Roland McKean. Efficiency in government through systems analysis. 
New York, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1958. 
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noncommon denominator effects and the two exhibits must both be weighted 
by the decision maker. 
Measurement Framework 
Having discussed the concepts involved, it is time to approach the 
problem of measurement. We have stipulated both the major variables to be 
affected by the activities of interest and the decision rules relating 
these effects. Next comes the actual measurement methodology involving the 
a priori or ex post valuation of effects with a project and effects without 
it. Two important aspects of the study are the with or without implications 
and the aggregation problems. The approach to be used assumes that measure­
ment is to be made a priori or ex post of the effects with a project, and 
effects without it. We desire project assessment at the societal level. 
Let us review briefly the underlying theory. Projects are different 
levels of disturbances for an activity and as such are mutually exclusive 
within an activity. In very general terms, the questions to be answered 
are paraphrased below; 
1. Should any resources be devoted to the activities from the societal 
point of view? The answer lies in whether the with streams are more 
socially optimal than the without streams. 
2. What is the socially optimal level of resource use in these 
activities? Whether an answer can be given to this will depend upon the 
specificity of the decision rule and the situation. 
3. What combination of projects is most optimal? Again the 
answerability depends upon the decision rule and the situation. 
One of the problems faced in the use of cost-benefit analysis in 
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evolutionary social action programs is that they are continuing programs, 
not one-shot projects. As opposed to building a particular dam or canal, 
they are flows of heterogeneous resources into activities and not stocks. 
One is attempting to evaluate activity levels, and to have any policy 
implications, one must be able to say with some certainty, what will happen 
in the future. The analyst must predict £ priori what will happen with 
respect to future activities. This implies something more than ex post 
justification of projects. The purpose of evaluating projects is to deter­
mine if one can infer from the experience of past programs what is likely 
to happen in the future. If the effects art-likely to be replicable then 
one is able to judge a priori using this ex post information the proximity 
of a project to social optimality. 
The activity hierarchy should be defined to be that which is most use­
ful in the determination of policy. If government exists to increase 
societal welfare, then benefit-cost analysis from a societal standpoint is 
important to policy formulation. Thus, ideally, the proper activity level 
should be that which answers a question somewhat to the effect "what is the 
government's role in terms of maximizing social welfare with respect to 
John Doe?" Operationally it is absurd to ask this of benefit-cost analysis, 
and the use of benefit-cost analysis falls far short of this operationally. 
The analyst is forced into a severe compromise not only because of con­
ceptual inadequacies and the vagary of his relative social welfare indicator, 
but because the information he must use is extremely imperfect. This 
imperfection is the result of: (1) slack between variables at the conceptual 
level and their magnitude indicators, (2) poor measurement of the magnitude 
indicators (imperfect data), and (3) no data on many magnitude indicators. 
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Because economic theory focuses upon the utility of the individual, 
the activities ought to be defined according to individual characteristics. 
Will social welfare be improved and if so to what optimal level by feeding 
persons with particular characteristics into an activity? What are the 
characteristics? Perhaps no one characteristic should be considered but 
rather an index of them. For instance, MDTA activities have in part, been 
intended to have an impact upon the "disadvantaged worker." Disadvantaged 
here implies a low level of individual welfare. The quality of being 
disadvantaged is indicated by a number of variables. Built into the index 
could be the potential training occupation. So perhaps from a policy stand­
point the activity should be delineated by type of training (OJT, IT, CT) 
and utility index range. The activity project table could be as shown 
below. 
Table 6. Index number activities 
Activity by 
index level Projects^ 
0-10 
OJT 
11-30 
31-70 
71-100 
0-10 
IT 
11-30 
31-70 
71-100 
0-10 
CT 
11-30 
31-70 
71-100 
Project definition follows in the next 
section. 
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Project determination 
The projects could be delineated in terms of magnitude of unit of 
Exchange regardless of the form of the decision rule common denominator. 
Thus, if projects were delineated by governmental expenditures level, 
attendant to each level would be a stream of effects which could be used 
as input into a decision rule to be compared to the no action alternative. 
Measurement 
What would have happened to society had there been no training 
program? What would happen (has happened) with the program? In other 
words, the task is to determine the nature and magnitude of the changes in 
society which accrue solely to the training program. 
To develop measures the analyst must know the form and completeness 
of data required by the decision rule and then design an evaluation 
methodology to quantitatively fulfill the requirements. The measure used 
for each variable must be in such a form as to be readily usable in the 
decision rule. The direction of the relationship between the variables and 
social welfare was stated in a Pareto Optimality fashion. It is difficult 
to utilize the approach because it is so often violated, impossible to 
measure, and if measured would require as much data input on each variable 
as there are persons in the society. The usual second-best operational 
approach can do further violence to the theory by either ignoring redistri­
bution effects or by weighting the project effects by recipients. To avoid 
a mass of "each person" effects data averages are used for specific groups; 
training associated and the rest of society. This makes the effects 
measurement manageable but obscures the impact on each person. A table in 
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the appendix to this chapter suggests possible forms of data compatible 
with the theory presented earlier. 
Having decided upon the possible measurement indicators for the 
variables, the next step is to devise methods for the actual measurement 
of effects. Most studies of manpower programs do this ex post. The 
changes in variables for persons directly involved in the project are 
measured and then abstracted and extrapolated to the aggregate level. Thus 
one encounters the possibility of engaging in the fallacy of composition. 
What is true of the trainees is not necessarily true for society. 
Secondary effects and externalities make up those effects that if 
ignored would result in the fallacy of composition. Technological exter­
nalities are efficiency and equity considerations and pecuniary exter­
nalities are considerations of equity as explained earlier. Both have 
effects on social welfare in terms of the magnitude of effects and the 
latter in terms of their distribution. 
One could assume that the results from evaluating the impact upon 
those directly involved in the training activity hold for the society as a 
whole. However, this is not the totality of effects. The effects upon 
in-plant nontrainees, some of the effects on the firm, and effects upon 
others in the labor force are not generally shown nor measureable in an 
analysis of changes in variables affecting the trainees. Taking each of 
the variables separately one may consider the external and secondary 
effects of training. This has been done for each variable in Appendix A. 
Table 7 summarizes the potential for external effects. 
An introductory treatment of the measurement methodology for internal 
and external effects is given below. A more detailed analysis builds upon 
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Table 7. External and secondary effects potential 
Variable Effect 
Employment Displacement 
Vacuum 
Underemployment Displacement 
Vacuum 
Skill Indirect effect via employment 
Education Indirect effects via employ­
ment 
Income Multiplier effects 
Transfer payments Negligible 
Growth Generally external to trainees 
Crime Victims of criminal activity 
Inflation Generally external to trainees 
Self-esteem Demonstration effects 
Family cohesiveness Demonstration effects 
Participation Demonstration effects and 
action effects 
this in the next chapter. 
Two basic approaches have been used to gamer the effects internal to 
training activities. These approaches also indicate possible quantitative 
extrapolations to the societal level. Both approaches attempt to detect 
those effects that result solely from training and which thus delete 
exogenous effects. 
Pretraining against post-training behavior 
This approach examines the level of the variables of the persons prior 
to being affected by the training program and compares it to the variable 
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levels after training. The method assumes that any changes in the 
variables are the result of the training program, i.e., that pretraining 
variables would remain the same for trainees if they had not joined the 
training program. Numerous persons have validly criticized this early 
approach for a number of reasons. Most recently in an article on the 
evaluation of social action programs Cain and Hollister^ summarized the 
arguments against this approach. 
1. Pretraining variable levels may be temporarily low or high. 
a. Low. Persons newly entering the labor force and joining the 
ranks of the unemployed and who are subsequently trained cause an over­
statement of post-training gains. They would have found some employment 
later and probably would not have been unemployed all of their lives. 
Training effects are overestimated using this method. 
b. High. A structurally unemployed meat cutter earning $3.50 
an hour before becoming unemployed, unless trained, could possibly earn 
only $1.50 per hour. Training effects are here underestimated. 
2. Causal effects due to changes in variables external to training 
are not deleted. For example, a trainee's improved employment record may 
be due to the cyclical expansion of the 1960's. 
Control groups 
Two types of control groups have been suggested. Both are attempts to 
approach the ideal control group: identical copies of the persons in 
contact with the program but who have had no contact with it themselves. 
^Cain and Hollister, og.. cit., pp. 11-12, 
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The stratification approach With this approach the persons who 
have come in contact with the training program are stratified by type of 
relationship with the program. Certain of the strata are chosen as control 
groups on the basis of their comparability to the target group. Ability 
and motivational differences are loosely controlled for here. 
As a control group approach, it overcomes the exogenous valuable 
problem of the pre-post training approach by including the experiences of 
other groups over the same time period. Its shortcoming is, however, the 
endogenous effects problt^n of not having a control group that is composed 
of twins to the trainees. This shortcoming is partially alleviated by 
using effects ranges rather than point estimates of effects. It also 
allows one to choose a conservative estimate for the effects. Unfortu­
nately it does not allow a very good estimate of the effects accruing to 
those who do not complete training or who do not enroll in it. 
Nontrainee control group The next control group approach utilizes 
a technique to overcome still more of the aforementioned shortcomings. Here 
a control group of persons is selected from the files of the Bureau of 
Employment Security (or some other agency). This group consists of persons 
unemployed at the same time as the trainees who have characteristics most 
like the trainees (an index approach implicitly) but who never came into 
contact with the program. The approach theoretically allows the determina­
tion of the effects of training on all persons affected by the program. 
This is a step forward, but still has troubles with the endogenous varia­
tion. The source of the records may provide an added bias due to the 
persons excluded by employment files. 
For the type of model developed here the analyst must determine, for 
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example, what a project's effects would be for an OJT index 10-30 at a 
$20,000 governmental input. An ex post evaluation requires knowledge of 
what would have happened if the trainees had not undergone training. In 
this approach the external factors could be handled by the above nontrainee 
control group approach. The index of disadvantagement taking into account 
skill, education, attitudes, motivation, length of unemployment, training 
occupation, etc. would provide an imperfectly homogeneous group of trainees. 
The control group would be composed of persons not in contact with the 
program but who have a similar index rating. The trainees could be 
stratified by relationship to the training course as before to determine 
the effects of partial completion of the training course. Thus effects 
from training could be more completely determined. More will be said about 
the statictical aspects of such a study in the next chapter. 
The assumption in using ex post analyses in order to prescribe policy 
is of course that the results will continue over time for each project. 
This is the Cain and ilollister requirement of replicability.^ The problems 
associated with replicability involve such factors as trainee homogeneity, 
statistical validity of ex post evaluations, administrative nonhomogeneity, 
geographical location, urban-rural situation, and training occupation. 
Thus it is hazardous to move from the particular situation to the general­
ization of results. To the extent that these can not be controlled by 
evaluation design (although numerous confounding factors could be deleted by 
proper choice of activity levels) one must assume they are not a significant 
deterrent to the use of the study for policy making. Subsequent studies 
^Cain and Hollister, o£. cit., pp. 15-19. 
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should provide some checks on validity for policy making. Small studies 
in a particular geographical area are most hazardous to use as general 
abstractions, but are probably more well done in terms of complete data 
than are larger, more general studies relying on incomplete data. These 
same factors inhibit the replicability of ai priori analysis of alternatives 
to the activities already in effect. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented a model for evaluation of manpower 
programs: here specifically for training programs. It is significant 
because it takes a very simplistic approach, shows what is involved in 
structuring a study, does not allow the usual benefit-cost generalization 
in that it demonstrates the tortuous path one must go through to use the 
unit of exchange common denominator for variables beyond income effects, 
shows the vulnerability of benefit-cost analysis to value judgements, 
shows the paucity of information about the system one has and the amount 
of information the analysis is really assumed to have, shows the problems 
and hazards inherent in zeroing in on trainees and not the society, 
questions the employment-social welfare relationship assumed by analysts, 
and shows the inadequacy of lumping all OJT-type and all IT-type programs 
together as activities. 
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MEASUREMENT 
The completeness and accuracy of data sources play an important role 
in quantifying the effects streams of projects. Following an assessment 
of data source strengths and weaknesses, the methodology of measurement 
introduced in the last chapter is treated in depth. 
Data Sources 
There are four primary and numerous secondary sources of data for 
benefit-cost analyses of MDTA programs. 
Virtually all studies begin with a data base collected by the training 
sponsoring agency during and following training. The data are from the 
standard forms: 101, "Characteristics of Trainees", filled out prior to 
training; 102, "Individual Trainee Termination Training or Services", filled 
out upon withdrawal from or upon completion of training; and 103 or 103a, 
"Post Training Followup", three, six and twelve month follow-ups of 
trainees. These records are sent to the Department of Labor where the 
data are computerized and stored. 
If the forms were accurate and complete, they would provide excellent 
data on trainees during and after training. They would only need to be 
supplemented by prior work history information (collected also by the 
Bureau of Employment of Security on a personal data card filled out before 
training), control group data, and cost data. Unfortunately they are 
neither complete nor accurate for reasons given below. Early programs 
understandably did not, in the action environment they were caught up in, 
place much emphasis on record collecting and follow-ups. Over time the 
records have improved, but the nature of the data collection mitigates 
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Lite J02 forms for on-the-job training may be filled out some time after 
the trainee has terminated training, often without contacting the trainee; 
drop-outs from the program are not subject to follow-ups; follow-ups con­
ducted by phone and mail do not reach trainees consistently. 
Because these are the only data sources of a nationwide nature, their 
lack of accuracy and completeness has prevented a rigorous comparison of 
training activities under the MDTA. The Department of Labor records do 
provide a list of names and noncurrent addresses of people associated with 
training programs. With these, other data sources can be tapped. 
Social Security data on earnings has been made available to investiga­
tors able to ensure data confidentiality. Direct information on earnings 
and indirect employment data are provided. However, the upper income limit 
(at $7800 probably no longer a bias, but lower earlier levels bias the 
data) and the exclusion from coverage of federal employees, some nonprofit 
organizations' employees, some non-self-employed persons (particularly 
farm workers), and nonreported earnings make the data less than universal 
in coverage and accuracy. 
The same criticisms apply to the data collected by the third source, 
the U.S. Employment Service, in the administration of unemployment insurance 
claims. These files have provided data on earnings, employment, unemploy­
ment compensation, and possible control group members. 
Finally, for in-depth local studies the use of the interview method 
for data collection provides the most complete information for analysis. 
The data to be collected can be tailored to research needs and can cover a 
wider range of variables over a longer time span. The method has several 
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serious drawbacks. 
Interviews are generally conducted for samples from the trainee popu­
lation. The population is generally taken from the files of the MDTA 
sponsor or Department of Labor files. The list of trainees who did not 
report or dropped out early in the training program may not be complete. 
Addresses found on the records are not kept current. This is particu­
larly true for persons who did not enroll in or dropped out of training. 
This results in expensive searches for current addresses and biases the 
population toward less mobile trainees. The addresses of more mobile 
trainees are difficult to find and when found are often out of the 
geographical range of the sample survey. Mail questionnaires for out-of-
range trainees have not achieved good response records. (One exception to 
this was a mail survey conducted of Oklahoma Indian trainees that received 
returns from 33% of the population.^) 
Interview accuracy is hampered by the psychological problems of inter­
viewer-interviewee proximity and the difficulty of quick recall of distant 
past events. Comparing trainee earnings interview responses with earnings 
reported by their employers, Michael Borus found "response error regresses 
significantly upon sex, age, education, training status (motivation to 
respond incorrectly), magnitude of reported earnings, interviewer famil-
2 iarity with the schedule, and number of hours employed." The mean 
^Paul Rountree Blume. An evaluation of institutional vocational 
training received by American Indians through the Muskogee Oklahoma Area 
Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Still­
water, Oklahoma, Library, Oklahoma State University. 1968. P. 97. 
2 
Michael E. Borus. Response error in survey reports of earnings 
information. Journal of American Statistical Association 61: 729. 1966. 
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deviation however was relatively small at $3.39 per week or about five 
percent of reported earnings.^ If the bias is uniform for both trainees 
and control groups or for both the pre- and post-training periods, the 
impact may be minimal due to analysis of differentials rather than absolute 
levels of variables. 
Finally, interview data is expensive. Population search, question­
naire composition, pilot interview for questionnaire shakedown, the survey 
itself, and coding put per interview costs in the $10 to $25 range. 
Supplemental data are usually accumulated from a variety of sources. 
Reports from Department of Labor agencies on costs, from Health, Education, 
and Welfare on costs, and from previous studies comprise most of this data. 
Control Groups 
The goal of the measurement techniques is to discern the magnitude of 
change in variables affected by training due solely to the impact of the 
training program. There have been five basic approaches toward this end. 
The ideal 
The ideal approach would be to first record the levels of all variables 
in society for an extended period of years following a training project 
starting date. Then time would be stopped, wound back to the starting date 
and rerun with the training project in effect for the persons involved in 
training. A comparison of the two variables records would indicate which 
variables were affected, by how much, and for how long. 
4bid., p. 731. 
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The experimental design 
As was explained earlier, the ideal is generally simulated by 
selecting a few major variables to study, assuming a time horizon, con­
structing a control group to determine what would have happened to the 
trainees without training, and extrapolating to society from trainee 
experiences. 
An approach much discussed of late and now being implemented on a few 
studies is the experimental test design.^ Here a population of persons 
eligible for training is gathered. Trainees are selected at random from 
the population and those left serve as a control for the trainee treatment 
group. Whether or not such an experimental approach can be worked into 
the administration of major social action programs on a widespread basis 
remains to be seen. Convincing achievement-minded program administrators 
of the merits of arbitrarily excluding high success potential and arbi­
trarily including low success potential trainees in the name of social 
experimentation that may put themselves out of a job will be a difficult 
task, let alone actually implementing such a design. 
Effects of types of employment demand on experimental findings 
In a recent issue of Yale Economic Essays Robert Goldfarb criticizes 
the control group approaches because "it is difficult to select a truly 
identical control group...." and "even if the seemingly ideal procedure 
2 
were followed, the results need not measure the desired quantities." 
^Glen C. Cain and Robinson Hollister. The methodology for evaluating 
social action programs. Discussion Papers. Madison, Wisconsin, Institute 
for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin. 1969. Pp. 43-47. 
2 Robert S. Goldfarb. The evaluation of government programs: the case 
of New Haven's manpower training activities. Yale Economic Essays 9: 69. 
1969. 
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The first criticism is undoubtedly true and could be even more strongly 
stated that selection of such a group is impossible for few would argue 
that two persons are identical in all respects. On an operational basis 
what is required of the control group is that they be as very nearly like 
the trainees as is possible. The proper variable measures of "likeness" 
are open to contention as is the allowable differential in these variables 
before "likeness" is transcended. It is a factor to be contended with in 
the use of the control group approaches, but it does not render it useless. 
Indeed, the experimental design is used specifically to minimize this 
source of variance in the program analysis. 
The second criticism follows from the hypothetical situation presented 
below: 
... suppose that New Haven had no training programs 
and the following employment situation existed: of 24 
persons jobless in 1962, 12 of them would have found jobs 
in 1964, and each of these jobs would have paid $100 a 
week. In New Haven with training programs, on the 
other hand, the same 24 persons were unemployed in 1962, 
but 12 of them went into training programs. The other 
12, who also applied for training, were denied entry to 
the course so that they could be used as a control 
group. The selection of people for training slots was, 
of course, completely random; thus, the control group 
was "ideally selected." Suppose that after training 
the 12 trainees got the same 12 $100-a-week jobs that 
would have existed in New Haven "untrained," while the 
12 nontrainees remained unemployed. When we compare 
trainee and control group incomes, it looks as though 
the income gains due to training are $1,200 a week, 
yet we know that the same $1,200 a week would have 
been earned by the same poverty population in the 
absence of training programs. Without incurring 
costs of training programs, exactly the same benefits 
would have resulted. Thus, the benefits that were 
measured are not really benefits of training at all. 
This result came about because only the trainees 
got the 12 existing jobs. Had the jobs been divided 
randomly between trainees and nontrainees, training 
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benefits would have shown up correctly as zero. It is 
possible that all 12 jobs (or, to make the case less 
extreme, more than half the jobs) went to the trainees 
instead of the control group because employers use 
screening devices when they hire. Thus, an employer 
will often hire someone with a high school diploma 
over someone without the diploma, even if the job to 
be filled can be performed just as well without the 
skills that such a diploma supposedly represents. 
The employer assumes that anyone with motivation 
enough to finish high school will be a better employ­
ment risk. In the same way, a training program 
diploma may be used by the employer to screen appli­
cants. In our example such behavior implies that the 
trainees get the existing jobs.^ 
What Goldfarb has outlined is a pure transfer or displacement effect. 
It can be controlled for in part by noting the occupational demand for 
types of training. If training is for "shortage" occupations, then this 
is likely to occur only if excess aggregate demand overcomes structural 
factors. Other types of transfer effects create a greater potential bias 
in times of recession than expansion due to trainee dropouts and/or rejects 
rather than completers. These instances will be elaborated upon later on 
in this chapter. The Goldfarb analysis holds for only one type of employ­
ment demand. This format for analysis of training effects, however, can be 
fruitfully extended to examine the biases involved in the various approaches 
to measurement. Thus various economic environments shall be presented and 
each analyzed with the experimental and pre-post approaches. 
The pre-post design assumes an initial state of unemployment for all 
workers. (Or equivalently, that any change in income is due to employment 
changes which may be treated "as if" the trainee were moving out of 
^Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
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unemployment.) Trainees serve as their own control group and gains derived 
from training are measured by subtracting pretraining levels of variables 
(here income) from post-training levels. 
The experimental design approach is as explained before and non-
trainees are assumed identical to trainees but for the treatment: 
training. All workers are assumed to maximize the present value of the 
income opportunities afforded them. 
Case strict structural unemployment 
Strict structural unemployment vacancies refer to jobs that already 
exist or result from increased aggregate demand but that remain vacant 
because employers either have no applicants for them or because they deem 
no applicants qualified to fill the vacancy. 
Ideally, in the absence of training none of the 24 would get a job. 
With training, the twelve trainees get the twelve jobs and the gain from 
training ideally is (12) ($100) = $1200. 
The pre-post design indicates a training gain of $1200 - 0 = $1200 
totally or $100 per trainee. 
The experimental design indicates a gain from training of (12) ($100) 
- (12) (0) = $1200 or an average of $100 per trainee. 
Both approaches yield correct estimates of training induced income 
gains to the economy. 
Case II. strict increased aggregate demand 
Now assume that the 12 vacancies in 1964 are the result of increased 
derived demand or that they are the result of employers lowering their 
hiring standards, i.e., increased aggregate demand overwhelms the structural 
factors. 
51 
Case IIA; Goldfarb assumption 
If the 12 vacancies are jobs the trainees trained for, then the 
transfer effects are possible. The 12 trainees are still more qualified 
than are the nontrainees. The difference here is that the employer is now 
willing to train the control group for the job whereas he was not willing 
to do so earlier. That he selects the trainees instead of the controls is 
rational for the government has trained or will pay for training the new 
employees. Societally the gain is zero. 
Both control groups approaches show a nonexistent gain of $1200. 
The probability of this case happening is diminished the more training for 
secularly shortage jobs, the higher the extent of trainee upgrading, and 
the greater the nontransferability and nonsubstitutability of the upgraded 
skills and education. This is discussed again under the transfer effects 
topic. 
Case IIB: equal opportunity 
If employers take all eligible employees on a first-come-first-hired 
basis, which is not unreasonable in periods of high demand, the analysis 
changes. 
Ideally all of the 24 have equal probability of becoming employed in 
the 12 demand vacancies. Increases in aggregate income due to training 
are zero. 
The pre-post design indicates a gain due to training of (6) ($100) 
- 0 = $600 or an average of $50 per trainee. Thus this approach severely 
overestimates the gains from training because it assumes all post-training 
income is due to filling structural vacancies. 
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The experimental design estimates a gain due to training of (6) ($100) 
- (6) ($100) = 0. The estimate is correct. 
Case IIIA; mixed vacancies, job rationing 
Assume job vacancies are the result of both increased aggregate 
demand and structural factors and that overall there are fewer vacancies 
than unemployed persons. Assume six of the jobs are the result of 
increased aggregate demand or the breaking down of employer structural 
barriers under prolonged excess demand. The other six are or remain 
structural vacancies. 
Higher structural present value Assume the structural jobs have a 
higher present value ($120) than demand jobs ($100). The trainees are 
eligible for all 12 jobs; the nontrainees are eligible only for the six 
demand jobs. The six structural vacancies will be filled by the trainees. 
If the trainees are prevented from seeking employment in the six demand 
jobs by a time factor due to competing for the six structural jobs, the six 
demand jobs will go to the nontrainees. If they are not prevented from 
doing so, the probable distribution of the six demand jobs is four to 
nontrainees and two to trainees. 
The gain in earnings due to the training is (6) ($120) = $720 totally 
or $60 per trainee as shown by the ideal approach. 
The pre-post design shows a gain of (6) ($120) + 2($100) - 0 = $920 
or 6($120) - 6(0) - 0 = $720. These are average per trainee gains of $77 
and $60 respectively. There is an overestimate due to the inability to 
distinguish between demand and structural gains or an exact estimate in the 
latter instance. 
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The experimental design indicates a training induced gain of 6($120) 
+ 2($100) - 4($100) = $520 or 6($120) + 0($10Q) - 6($100) = $120. This 
design overestimates the opportunity costs of training by the entire non­
structural earnings amount and thus underestimates training gains. 
Lower structural present value Assume the structural vacancies to 
have lower present value ($80) than the demand vacancies ($100). 
Ideally one could expect the 24 to compete for the $100 jobs resulting 
in a three-three distribution. The structural jobs would then be filled 
by the trainees and the gain from training would be $480. 
The pre-post design indicates a gain from training of 3($100) + 6($80) 
- 0 = $780. Again an overestimate due to improper assessment of demand 
employment increases results. 
The experimental design indicates an economy training gain of 6($80) 
+ 3($100) - 3($100) or $480 which is the correct amount. 
Case IIIB: mixed vacancies, no job rationing 
Here increased aggregate demand vacancies are plentiful. 
Higher structural present value Structural vacancies have a 
present value of $120 and demand vacancies a present value of $100. In 
the absence of training the twelve nontrainees would get $100 jobs. The 
gain from training would be 6($120) minus the opportunity cost of 6($100) 
or $120. 
The pre-post design shows a training gain of 6($120) + 6($100) - 0 = 
$1320. The usual aggregate demand problem persists, but even correcting 
for this, the method fails due to an incorrect assessment of the opportunity 
cost of training. 
54 
The experimental design approach would estimate 6($120) + 6($100) -
12($100) = $120 or $10 per trainee average. 
Lower structural present value Assume the structural jobs have a 
lower present value ($80) than the demand jobs ($100). The twelve 
trainees and nontrainees would ideally take none of the structural jobs. 
There would be zero gains to training. 
The pre-post approach would show 12($100) - 0 = $1200 which is an 
overestimate for the usual reason. 
The experimental design estimate would be 12($100) - 12($100) = 0 for 
the correct value. 
Case IV; mixed vacancies, multiple present values 
Both structural and increased aggregate demand vacancies exist in the 
economy. The present values of the structural vacancies lie above and 
below the present value of the aggregate demand vacancies. 
Case IVA; no job rationing 
The situation is self-explanatory except that there now exist three 
structural vacancies at $80 and three at $120 and all demand jobs at $100. 
Six structural trainees train for the $80 jobs and six for the $120 jobs. 
All are eligible for the $100 jobs. 
The ideal estimate of gains due to training would show the twelve 
nontrainees in $100 jobs, the six $80 job structural trainees in $100 jobs, 
three $120 structural job trainees in $100 jobs and three in $120 structural 
jobs. The gain from training would be 3($120) minus an opportunity cost 
of 3($100) = $60 or $5 per trainee. 
The pre-post design would show gains of 9($100) + 3($120) - 0 = $1260. 
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The overestimate is due to opportunity cost and demand vacancy factors. 
The experimental design shows gains due to training of 3($120) + 
9($100) - 12($100) = $60 which is the correct estimate. 
Case IVB; job rationing 
The ideal approach should reveal three trainees in $120 jobs and nine 
vying with the other 12 for six demand vacancies. A probable distribution 
of the six demand jobs would be four to nontrainees and two to trainees. 
The three $80 structural jobs would be taken by trainees. The true gain 
to training is 3($120) + 3($80) = $600. 
The pre-post technique estimates 2($100) + 3($120) + 3($80) - 0 = $800. 
The overestimate is due to aggregate demand miscalculation. Or it could 
be exact if the trainees were in some way barred from taking the $100 jobs: 
3($120) + 3($80) - 0 = $600. 
The experimental design shows 3($120) + 3($80) + 2($100) - 4($100) = 
$400. The underestimate is due to the overestimate of opportunity cost of 
training. 
These results are shown in Table 8. 
The experimental design yields incorrect estimates of the gains to 
society from training for the Goldfarb situation and in periods of less 
than full employment with structural jobs offering trainees a higher present 
value occupation. The underestimate of gains results from overestimating 
the opportunity cost of training to society. The jobs that the trainee 
could fill in the nonstructural vacancies could just as easily be filled 
by nontrainees. 
As defined, the pre-post design contains an aggregate demand bias in 
Table 8. Control group bias by environment 
Pre-post design Experimental design 
Case Environment 
Training gain 
measurement Reason 
Training gain 
measurement Reason 
II. 
III. 
Strict structural 
unemp loyment 
Increased aggregate 
demand 
A. Goldfarb 
assumption 
B. Equal 
opportunity 
Mixed vacancies 
A. Job rationing 
Higher structural 
present value 
Lower structural 
present value 
B. No job rationing 
Higher structural 
present value 
Lower structural 
present value 
Exact 
Overestimate 
Overes timate 
Overestimate or 
exact 
Overestimate 
Overes timate 
Overestimate 
Transfer effect 
No correction for 
aggregate demand 
No correction for 
aggregate demand 
No correction for 
aggregate demand 
No correction for 
aggregate demand, 
and underestimates 
opportunity cost 
No correction for 
aggregate demand 
Exact 
Overestimate 
Exact 
Underes timate 
Exact 
Exact 
Exact 
Transfer effect 
Overestimate of 
opportunity cost 
Table 8. (Continued) 
Pre-post design Experimental design 
Training gain Training gain 
Case Environment measurement Reason measurement Reason 
IV. Mixed vacancies, 
multiple present 
values 
A. No job rationing Overestimate No correction for Exact 
aggregate demand, 
and underestimates 
opportunity cost 
B. Job rationing Overestimate or 
exact 
No correction for 
aggregate demand 
Underestimate Overestimate of 
opportunity cost 
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all cases except for the case of strict structural unemployment and 
probably for the case of mixed unemployment, job rationing, with at least 
some higher structural unemployment present values. It also fails to 
correctly estimate the social opportunity cost of training in situations 
of mixed vacancies, of no job rationing, and higher structural present 
values for at least some jobs. 
The in-training and post-training environments are important consid­
erations in the choice of an evaluation approach. Even the ideal experi­
mental design can yield inaccurate estimates of gains accruing solely to 
training. An underestimate comes when estimated private opportunity costs 
exceed social opportunity costs. The relevant question becomes, could 
and would the jobs given up by trainees for training be filled by other 
persons. The answer is probably yes. The skill level and income of most 
trainees is, except in the case of some upgraded persons, quite low. That 
is why they qualify for retraining. Upgrades are trained on the theory 
that the resultant vacancy will be filled to provide entry level jobs. For 
measuring gains to training in terms of increased aggregate income and 
employment the fact that trainees could have gotten jobs is not the impor­
tant consideration. The question is whether or not the jobs trainees give 
up or forego due to training would be filled if the trainees never re­
entered the labor force. 
One corrective approach might be to drop the control group earnings. 
That approach is not feasible because it is then the pre-post design and 
overestimates returns to training by increases in aggregate demand employ­
ment . 
A correct estimate of training gains in increased aggregate earnings 
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and employment requires a separation of trainees into two groups: those 
who fill vacancies they and the control group wouldn't fill otherwise and 
those who fill vacancies that they would. This is just a restatement of 
the original problem. The choice is between a pre-post overestimate and 
an experimental design underestimate (or possible overestimate). 
Pre-post correction factor 
A correction used for the pre-post method is to subtract from post-
training earnings, the amount of income earned over a period of time prior 
to training. This model assumes such a correction has already been made. 
Any change in income over the previous year's income must come from 
switching to a higher paying job opportunity as a result of increased 
aggregate demand or due to switching to training occupations. This does 
not nullify the fact that the post-training estimate is overstated to the 
extent that the trainee is recently structurally displaced or understated 
if he is a labor force entrant. 
Other variables 
The above discussion pertained to the efficiency effects of training 
in expanding aggregate income and employment. The analytic framework 
developed in the preceding chapter stressed the fact that more effects than 
these are important to the evaluation of training activities. The same 
control group problems arise in the measurement of these effects however. 
Skill increases for instance could come from a training program or through 
a tightening in the labor market whereby employees were hired and employer-
trained on the job. Those effects that stem from income or employment 
cannot be attributed to training until the income effects to training can be 
delineated. 
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Negative efCects 
The negative effects of training include: 
1. disruption effects in plants hiring and spending time with 
disadvantaged trainees, 
2. wage effects of increased labor supply, and 
3. alienation effects of dropouts and those refused training.^ 
The first two effects could obviously not be measured utilizing control 
groups. The third negative effect lies within the realm of the control 
group approach but is not easily measured. These persons would have an 
effect upon aggregate output and income only if the dropouts and rejectees 
did not take jobs available only to them. Thus in the "no job rationing" 
cases would include negative effects, but would not explicitly separate 
them from other effects. A potential negative effect exists if alienated 
persons alienate others such that future training attempts fail. This 
would include direct influence, demonstration effects, and second genera­
tion effects. 
The model assumptions 
All workers are assumed to maximize the present value of the income 
opportunities afforded them. Actually the assumption need not be so 
restrictive. The analysis requires only that there be enough persons 
seeking work to fill the vacancies available that do not require training. 
One need not attribute such a motivation to the trainees either for the 
^Cain and Hollister, 02.. cit., p. 34. 
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analysis to hold. The gains to training are measured regardless of motiva­
tion. Differences in motivation would affect the magnitude of the gains 
from training but not their method of measurement. 
With the assumption of maximization of present value of affordable 
income streams comes implications for dropouts from training and for 
persons who refuse training. The implication is that persons dropping out 
or refusing to train do so either as the result of finding employment 
offering a higher present value or, if the refusal or dropout is not for 
employment (excluding reasons of physical impairment), that alternative 
income sources exceed the employment source. As emphasized before, for 
purposes of measurement, the performance is important not the motivation. 
The nontrainee control groups are assumed to be very nearly paired to 
the trainees. This is a difficult assumption to make as asserted earlier. 
The experimental design minimizes the problem of personal differences by 
assigning the training treatment at random. Other control group approaches 
attempt to approximate the experimental design with varying degrees of 
success. 
The stratified control group 
Several measurement approaches involve the comparison of subgroups 
(strata) of those persons associated with training. One or more of the 
strata are chosen to represent those persons gaining from training; the 
others become control groups. For the cases where control group earnings 
are important, one must assume that persons in the control group could 
just as readily avail themselves of aggregate demand employment as could 
the trainees in the absence of a program. 
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All personal variables that could account for differential employment 
and income behavior are allowed for by utilizing analysis of variance, 
cross-tabulation or multiple regression techniques. The more recent 
studies utilize multiple regression analysis, so this approach will be 
expanded upon here.. 
The independent variables usually include everything the analyst has 
information on for both the trainees and control groups. Demographic 
differences, past employment and earnings experience, and any tests of 
personality or ability differences have served as explanations of differ­
entials in the dependent variable. Problems arise when certain of the 
explanations of different labor force experience prove to be unmeasurable. 
Three such nonmeasurables (and unmeasured variables) are personal appear­
ance, motivation, and ability. The last can be measured in part by test 
performance, but such test scores are rarely obtained or are not available 
for both groups. To analysts the most distressing nonmeasurable has 
proven to be motivation. 
Thus, for example, the standard criticism of training analyses com­
paring training completers with training dropouts and/or nonenrollees is 
that the gains to training are overestimated due to lower motivation on 
the part of dropouts and nonenrollees than training completers. 
A further subdivision of training associated persons was devised by 
Michael Borus^ in an attempt to circumvent the motivation problem. The 
strategy was to pick a set of strata that showed higher and lower motivation 
I 
Michael E. Borus. The economic effectiveness of retraining the 
unemployed. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Report No. 35. 1966. 
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than training gainers and thus provide a range of results. 
Upper limits for training gains would result from comparison of 
training completers taking training related jobs with noncompleters and 
persons refusing training without employment. The lower bound for training 
gains would derive from a comparison of completers with training related 
jobs and completers with nontraining related employment. The underlying 
motivation for this was that the latter group would consist of persons 
offered higher income and employment than those remaining in training 
related jobs. Hence, those in nontraining related jobs must be the most 
able and motivated of the groups. 
Goldfarb has countered the argument by saying completers in non-
training related occupations arrive there as a result of having been 
beaten out of training related jobs by the other completers and hence are 
less motivated and less able than other completers.^ Thus another upper 
limit, not a lower limit, is established. 
No doubt elements of both theories are correct. The nontraining 
related completers group could be comprised of persons there for both 
reasons. The proportion and consequent bias is unknown, but it is no 
doubt closer to a lower limit than the other two groups. 
There is another consideration overlooked by both arguments. That is 
that the training related employed group may not contain all those who fill 
structural vacancies. Because it is not known for certain what it is about 
training that causes the filling of job vacancies, the restriction of 
training gains to training related occupations may be too strict. A 
^Goldfarb, 0£. cit., p. 70. 
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completer may utilize substitutable and transferable skills and education 
received in training to fill a structurally vacant nontraining-related 
occupation. This additional factor would tend to enhance the argument 
that group two presents a lower bound. 
The nontraining-associated control group 
In general the control group consists of persons selected from the 
files of the Bureau of Employment Security that were unemployed at the same 
time as those associated with the training program. Of the unemployed 
population, the control group is chosen to be most like the training 
associated group on the basis of a set of demographic characteristics and 
employment history. This avoids the overt stratification according to 
nonmeasurable characteristics, but it does not avoid the problem of 
potential differences. One might still expect a motivational bias. The 
control group for some reason was not included in the training program. The 
reason may have been motivational or due to a selection process that would 
bias the results. However, the consideration of some surveys of the dis­
advantaged which show many had never heard of the training programs, lends 
support to the possibility of gathering such a control group. 
The structural horizon 
The analyst must determine a horizon for "structural" effects. Given 
it exists, how long would the structural vacancy persist in the absence of 
training? On the demand side the vacancy might be ended due to either 
increased aggregate demand breaking down structural barriers, or substitu­
tion of capital for labor. 
The supply side could adapt to the vacancy eventually by increased 
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education, geographical mobility, occupational mobility, and/or changes in 
the labor force participation rate. 
The structural vacancy horizon would vary per occupation. In the 
absence of such knowledge the analyst is forced to assume a horizon. After 
structural vacancies are overcome by changes in supply and/or demand, 
income accruing to trainees would be transfer effects. 
Another facet of horizon determination involves the occupational 
mobility of trainees. The Borus study pointed out that trainees placed in 
structural vacancies may leave them for other jobs which are not structural 
vacancies, thereby decreasing the gains to training. There may also be a 
reverse flow of trainees into structural vacancies from nonstructural 
vacancies. 
Displacement effects 
As noted several times earlier, there is one other debilitating 
consideration to be made in the evaluation of training program measurement 
approaches. It is possible that income and employment increases result 
which are shown to accrue to training, but which in fact are made at the 
expense of the rest of society directly and are a transfer effect. Such 
an effect has been termed a displacement effect. It arises when trainees 
are enabled, due to training, to compete for jobs they would not normally 
be able to obtain. The difference between these jobs and "structural" 
vacancies is that other persons are already qualified for these vacancies. 
Any gains to trainees here are at the expense of other persons already 
qualified to take the job. Such displacements do not increase aggregate 
employment or income and are thus employment and income transfers. 
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None of the designs for measuring the effects of training distinguish 
adequately between the structural and displacement effects. Any correction 
utilizing a control group or pre-training variable levels must attribute 
increases to overcoming structural employment because the control group 
and pre-training trainees would not be able to cause displacement 
effects. 
The implications of the above analysis extend to both the justifica­
tion and planning of training programs. Benefit-cost ratios have two 
major inaccuracies of indeterminable magnitude: unmeasured effects and 
transfer effects. Unmeasured effects take on a new significance in the 
presence of transfer effects. The gain of some at the direct expense of 
others would force the analysis into a compensation principles problem or 
to the dictatorial specification of a privileged group of individuals in 
society. Unmeasured effects could overweigh the transfer effects. 
Analysts have tended to justify programs on the basis of benefit-cost 
ratios in excess of unity for government and society figured largely from 
measured increases in aggregate income. Displacement effects cause the 
income measurements to be a mixture of true and transfer effects and could 
cause overestimates of income increases, tax revenues, and decreased public 
transfer payments. 
The comparison of alternatives to training programs is made difficult 
by displacement effects because the alternatives may involve an unknowable 
displacement differential. If the alternatives were occupationally 
identical and of the same magnitude the displacement effects would be of 
lesser importance but not insignificant. Differential effects could still 
exist. 
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Summary 
Thus, there seems to be no "correct" approach to measurement of 
effects streams. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Of 
the approaches explored, it would appear that the experimental design has 
a comparative advantage. However, all approaches suffer unknowable biases 
due to unmeasured effects, transfer effects, and data deficiencies. At 
this point in project analysis the uncertainties have been maximally 
acknowledged. More questions than answers have been provided but hopefully 
the analysis has rendered the user of benefit-cost analysis a greater 
awareness of the uncertainties involved in quantitative analysis. 
The next chapter explores an alternative to benefit-cost analysis, 
and then examines methods of optimal project level determination given 
adequate benefit-cost measure have been found. 
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BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: ALTERNATIVES AND EXTENSIONS' 
Earlier chapters have examined the difficulties the use of benefit-
cost analysis encounters at the conceptual and measurement levels. This 
chapter examines two approaches to efficient allocation. The first, 
discriminant analysis, could be used to delineate a set of "successful" 
training alternatives. The second involves the use of two linear pro­
gramming algorithms to optimally allocate trainees among training programs. 
It extends what appears to be the most interesting of the MDTA studies to 
1 date: the Hardin and Borus study of Michigan institutional training. 
Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis and a decision rule utilizing the results of 
discriminant analysis could be a means of efficient allocation of societal 
resources toward manpower training and retraining. "The problem to be 
solved is the following: Assume that we have a set of measurements of a 
number of variables which are classified into two groups. Which linear 
combination of the various measurements will in a certain sense best 
.2 discriminate between the two groups?" 
The groups in this context would be "successful" trainees and "unsuc­
cessful" trainees. The set of measurements would derive from information 
on trainee and course characteristics. The measurements on each variable 
Einar Hardin and Michael Borus. Economic benefits and costs of 
retraining courses in Michigan. East Lansing, Michigan, School of Labor 
and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University. 1969. 
2 Gerhard Tintner. Econometrics. New York, New York, John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc. 1952. P. 96. 
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would be separated into two groups according to some measure of training 
success (failure). Then a linear function of the differences of the means 
of the two groups of observations for each variable would be derived to 
discriminate between the two groups. Substitution of the general averages 
of the observations into the estimated linear discriminant function yields 
a criterion figure. Deviations on either side of the criterion classifies 
a new item as a potential "success" or "failure". 
The discriminant criterion could be utilized to separate a set of 
potential trainees into subsets of potentially successful and potentially 
unsuccessful trainees. Or, on a continuous referral basis, a decision 
could be made to train or not to train on the basis of the criterion. 
These approaches assume that the new trainees and courses are drawn from 
the same populations as those utilized to derive the criterion. 
Movement toward optimal resource allocation could be controlled either 
by a decision rule utilizing the criterion and/or by the method used to 
determine the criterion. 
Specification of success and failure determines the criterion. 
Participants in a training program could be classed as successes or 
failures on the basis of a number of variables: income gain, post-training 
employment experience, effect upon transfer payments, attitudinal change, 
training status (complete, ..., dropout), etc. This has the virtue, 
compared to benefit-cost analysis, of overcoming the dollar common denomina­
tor problem. Here the denominator is success. 
The criterion can be derived such that deviations on the "success" 
side indicate varying degrees of success and therefore degrees of poten­
tially optimal training resource allocation. Only those obviously 
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benefitting from training might be included in the "success" group and 
those with more undecided training outcomes could be included along with 
the obvious failures in the "unsuccessful" class. 
The potential trainees could then, via the discriminant function, be 
partitioned into two groups: "high success potential" and "low success 
potential" trainees. In the same vein, one might include those less 
obviously benefitting from training in the success group, but increase 
the level of statistical significance required of the discriminant function. 
Discriminant analysis might be used to delineate regions of success. 
In the simplest approach the surveyed population might be divided by 
limits on their data variables into groups: A - those obviously bene­
fitting, B - those neither obviously benefitting nor not obviously not 
benefitting, and C - those obviously not benefitting from training. 
Two discriminant functions could be derived. The first would use 
group A as successes, and B and C as failures. The second would use groups 
A and B as successes and C as failures. The two criteria thus derived 
might then class potential trainees as potentially obvious successes, 
potentially obvious failures, or in a midrauge of dubious training outcome 
possibilities. 
The decision rule might in this case be to train all trainees falling 
in the potentially successful range. Or, given a budget constraint, the 
decision may be to train all trainees in the successful range and, in the 
event of budget excess, begin to train the next class or retain the budget 
excess. 
A second approach would be to delineate the successful and failure 
groups with less strict variable limits on the groupings, but control 
training access via the decision rule. For example: allocate the budget 
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Lo trail"! only those with scores X above the criterion, or train potential 
entrants beginning with the largest deviation in the success direction and 
proceed down the scores until the budget is exhausted. 
The single use of discriminant analysis to predict success or failure 
for trainees did not prove successful. In a study of Atlanta, Georgia's 
MDTA training, Trooboff found that discriminant analysis "failed to identify 
successful trainees 17 percent of the time, and it failed to identify non-
successful trainees 52 percent of the time."^ Trooboff utilized the 
following characteristics: race, sex, age, educational grade level, work 
experience, responsibility factors, training absenteeism, place of resi­
dence, and education level of father. Success was defined to be employment 
80 percent of the time the trainee was available following training. 
Earlier analysis in the study showed that only responsibility factors had 
a significant effect upon percentage of time employed after training. 
These factors included marital status, number of dependents, family status, 
number of children and, for youth, place of residence. 
Such results might be explained by the success criterion utilized and 
the included variables. Perhaps a success criterion of percentage employ­
ment improvement could be utilized to relate post-training to pre-training 
levels. (Again, however, the pre-post comparison caveats are pertinent.) 
That the only significant determinants of success were the responsibility 
variables, suggests the possibility that psychological variables neither 
^Benjamin M. Trooboff. Employment experience after MDTA training. 
Atlanta, Georgia, Center for Manpower Studies, Atlanta University. 1968. 
P. 184. 
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included nor proxied for may be significant success explanans. The general 
inability of the analysis to detect significant determinants of success 
conflicts with the results of other studies such as the Hardin and Borus 
Michigan study. Thus discriminant analysis may be a more fruitful approach 
for other bodies of data for greater numbers of variables. 
Linear programming and benefit-cost analysis 
The most lengthy study of institutional training to date could be the 
most promising for efficient resource allocation if in fact the measured 
benefits and costs were truly social ones. In December of 1969, Einar 
Hardin and Michael Borus completed a study undertaken in 1963 of Michigan 
institutional training programs. It is the first study to utilize inter­
action effects to delineate, via multiple regression techniques, those 
factors causing variation in training gains and costs. Earlier studies 
sought to isolate only gains to training or used less reliable tools of 
analysis (e.g. cross tabulation). 
Extensive information was collected from government agencies and a 
trainee-control group sample was "selected to contain classes that varied 
in the characteristics of the courses themselves, of the occupations for 
which the classes were intended, and of the labor markets where the classes 
were conducted."^ The "procedure amounted to a search for an equation 
which explained the highest possible fraction of the variance of the depen­
dent variable after allowance for the number of independent variables 
employed in the equation and within prior limitations as to admissable 
1 
Hardin and Borus, o£^. cit., p. 2. 
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variables."^ The search method was used to prepare twelve "detailed 
estimates" of components of benefits and costs. These twelve estimates 
were then combined to yield benefits and costs on the basis of character­
istics for the entire program and for subsets of the program, economic 
environment, and trainee characteristics. Although these results are of 
dubious social magnitude given our previous considerations, it is inter­
esting to explore possible uses for the information that future studies 
might yield. 
The multiple regression search technique could be utilized to delineate 
homogeneous groups of persons potentially trainable via an array of training 
programs. Substitution of occupation, program, and group characteristics 
data into the equations would yield benefit and cost estimates that could 
be used for efficient resource allocation. This approach can best be 
formulated as a linear programming problem. The problem is to maximize the 
social benefits derived by allocating homogeneous groups among types of 
training programs until the budget is exhausted (a given social cost). 
The objective is the maximization of benefits derived from training. 
The constraints consist of the program budget and the size of the homo­
geneous groups. The problem of individual trainee discrete changes in 
benefits and costs could be avoided by estimating benefits and costs for 
the entire group. The variables thus become proportions of homogeneous 
groups trained. 
To examine the methodology of allocation, take as an example a single 
^Ibid., p. 88. 
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program with N groups i trainable to yield group benefits of at cost 
C^. Given a budget of M, what is the optimal allocation of trainees to 
training slots? The general problem is thus: 
Maximize: E. B.P. = Z i = 1, N i=l 11 
N 
Subject to: .E, C.P. < M i = 1 N 1=1 11— 
0 £ < 1 i = 1, N 
Where: 
= Total benefits for training group i 
= Total cost for training group i 
P^ = Proportion of group i trained 
M = Total training budget 
The equation formulation becomes : 
^1^1 + • • • + VN + 0^1 + 0^2 - Z = 0 
IP, + IR, =1 
^ IP2 + IRg = 1 
iPn + = 1 
C^Pl + C^Pg + ... + C^p^ + OR^ + ... + OR^ = M 
The R^ are the proportions of trainee groups not trained. 
As an example, and to explore the solution, consider a program with 
the data shown below: 
B^ =120 M = 120 C_ = 80 
Bg = 100 = 60 
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Maximize: 
Subject to; E. C.P. = 120 i=l 1 1 
0 < P. <1 
— 1 — 
Following the Simplex Method^ the first, second and final cycles are 
shown: 
Cycle 0 
Admissable Artificial Objective 
variables variables variables Constants Ratios 
Basic 
variables P^^ P^ A^ A^ A^ -Z -W b^ R 
A ^  1 0 1 0 1  1  
A ^  0 1 0 1 1  1  1  
A. 60 80 0 0 1 120 3/2 
-Z -120 -100 0 0 1 0 
-W -61 -81 -1 -1 1 -122 
^George B. Dantzig. Linear programming and extensions. Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1963. Pp. 94-119. 
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Cycle 1 
Basic 
variables 
Admissable 
variables 
Artificial Objective 
variables variables Constants Ratios 
Pi Pg Rg ^2 ^3 R 
1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 
60 0 0 -80 -80 1 40 2/3 
-Z 
—W 
-120 0 0 100 100 
-61 0 -1 80 81 
100 
-41 
Optimal 
Basic 
variables 
Admissable 
variables 
Artificial Objective 
variables variables Constants Ratios 
Pi Pg Ri ^2 ^1 ^2 ^3 R 
0 3/4 1 3/4 1 -1/80 
1 -3/4 0 -3/4 0 1/80 
0 0  1 0  0  
1/4 
3/4 
1 
-Z 
-W 
0 0 45 0 45 0 5/4 1 195 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1  1  0  
The optimal allocation of groups to training is given by: 
Z = 195 Pl= 1 
Pg = 3/4 
Rg = 1/4 
Rl = 0 
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In a problem of this form the first iteration always involves the 
funding of the highest training cost alternative (most negative -W value) 
as a matter of convention. Successive iterations fund highest -W alterna­
tives until the budget is exhausted, then proceed to reallocate the budget 
to the optimum. The final solution to this problem, however, exhibits a 
pattern that will be found to continue throughout the analysis. Group one 
with a benefit-cost ratio of two is fully funded. The remainder of the 
budget is used to train group two (benefit-cost ratio of 1.25). The 
alternative with the highest benefit-cost ratio is funded, then the next 
highest, and so on down the benefit-cost hierarchy until the budget is 
exhausted. This is a standard benefit-cost procedure. Take as a second 
example an expanded problem involving three groups: 
= 120 Bg = 100 B^ = 250 
= 6 0  C g  8 0  =  1 0 0  
B^/C^ = 2.0 Bg/Cg = 1.25 Bg/Cg = 2.5 
Budget = 150 
Maximize: Z = ®i^i ^ ~ ^ 
3 
Subject to: .E, C.P. < 150 1 = 1  1 1 —  
0 < P. < 1 
— 1 — 
Prior to completion of the iterations one might predict the solution 
from the solution of the earlier problem: 
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Rank, by B^/C^ Costs Budget Allocation 
Bg/C = 2.50 = 100 $100 1 
B^/C^ =2.00 = 60 50 5/6 
Bg/Cg =1.25 Cg = 80 0 0 
Z = (1) (250) + (5/6) (120) = 350 
Prediction: Z = 350 
P^ = 5/6 = 1/6 
P2- 0 Rj. 1 
Pj. 1 R3. 0 
Simplex Solution 
Cycle 0 
Admissable Artificial 
Basic variables variables Basic Constants Ratios 
variables 
^2 ^3 "1 ^ 2 ^ 3 4 4 ^3 
—z —w 
^i 
R 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 00 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 00 
A3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
60 80 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 150 1.5 
-Z -120 -100 -250 0000000 10 0 
-W -61 -81 -101 -1-1-1 0 0 0 0 0 1 -153 
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Cycle 1 
Admissable Artificial 
Basic variables variables Basic Constants Ratios 
variables P^ P^ R^ R^ R^ A^ A^ A^ A^ -Z -W b^ R 
A^ 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 «> 
A ^  0 1 0 0 1 0 1  1  1  
P ^  0 0 1 0 0 1  1  1  "  
A, 60 80 0 0 0 -100 -100 1 50 5/8 
4 — 
-Z -120 -100 0 0 0 250 250 1 250 
-W -61 -81 0 -1 -1 100 101 1 -52 
End Phase I 
Basic 
vari­
Admissable Artificial 
variables variables Basic Constant Ratios 
ables 
^1 ^ 2 :^3 ^1 ^2 S 4 4 ^3 
-Z -W b^ R 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 00 
S 
0 0 0 3/5 4/5 1 3/5 4/5 1 -•1/100 9/10 9/8 
0 0 1 -3/5 -4/5 0 -3/5 -4/5 0 1/100 1/10 (-) 
^2 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
-Z 0 0 0 -30 -100 0 -30 -100 0 5/2 1 245 
- W  0 0 0 0 0 0  1 1 1 1  1  0  
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End Phase II Optimal 
Adniissable Artificial 
variables variables Basic Constant Ratios 
vari­
ables 
^2 ^3 ^2 s 4 A3 
A, -Z -W 
4 
b. 
1 
R 
1 4/3 0 0 0 -5/3 0 0 -5/3 1/60 5/6 
"1 
0 -4/3 0 1 0 5/3 1 0 5/3 -1/60 1/6 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
'^2 
0 1 0 0 I 0 0 1 0 0 1 
-Z 0 60 0 0 0 50 0 0 50 2 1 350 
Solution: Z = 350 
P^ = 5/6 = 1/6 
- 0 R,. 1 
P3 - 1 E3 • 0 
As predicted, trainees are allocated to the highest benefit-cost alterna­
tives until the budget is exhausted. In general, then, the optimal alloca­
tion of a budget proceeds by funding the highest benefit-cost ratios until 
the budget is exhausted. 
Consider a more interesting problem where the homogeneous groups may 
be trained by either OJT or IT, or not trained at all. A given budget is 
to be expended on training. One must select the proportion of each group 
to be trained by one or the other of the two methods. 
The objective function retains its form. However, a problem arises 
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in the delineation of groups. The OJT and IT methods are mutually exclu­
sive activities for a particular group. A single allocation problem could 
not list as independent items the same homogeneous groups to be trained by 
OJT and IT. Such a combination might indicate a group to be trained 
entirely both by OJT and IT. The optimum allocation must be made by 
selecting from among all possible budget distributions over all possible 
group distributions. To obtain independent group items the potential 
trainees in a particular group could be split into subgroups by type of 
training. Then all possible budget distributions could be tried for this 
group distribution and the optimum optimorum selected from the generated 
set of optima. 
For example, consider a budget of $100,000 to be allocated among three 
groups of persons potentially trainable by OJT and IT methods. 
An initial distribution might be specified as below in Table 9. 
Table 9. Trainee group-training activity distribution 
Group i Total trainees Proportion in OJT(Q^) Proportion in IT(Q^) 
1 1000 0.5 0.5 
2 900 0.3 0.7 
3 1250 0.8 0.2 
Each budget distribution for the above group distribution would present 
two allocation problems of the form: 
3 
Maximize: Z = .E, B.P. i=l 1 i 
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3 
Subject to: C.P. < M 
1 = 1  1 1  —  
0 < P. <1 
— 1 — 
One would be calculated for each program. 
For the split shown above and a budget distribution of $70,000 to 
OJT and $30,000 to IT, the linear programs become: 
Maximize; 2°"^^ = .E 
1=1 1 1 
3 OL 0 < Subject to: = $70,000 
0 < P. < 1 
— 1 — 
Where is the benefit derived from training the entire subgroup i 
indicated by the specified group distribution. P^*^ is the proportion of 
the specified subgroup trained by OJT. is the cost determined as for 
In similar fashion, for institutional training the problem becomes: 
3 
Maximize: B.^P.^ 
1=1 1 1 
3 I I 
Subject to: C. P. = $30,000 
1—1 1 1 
0  <  p /  <  1  
— 1 — 
Where: = B.^T q/ 
1 1 1  
c.i-cA q/ 
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The sum + Z^ would be the optimal allocation conditional upon 
the specified budget and training group distribution. As was noted before, 
each Z^(D = 0,1) could be found by funding the training groups with the 
highest benefit-cost ratios until the budget was exhausted. The optimum 
budget distribution conditional upon the group distribution would be the 
largest of the set of Z^'s generated by all possible budget distribu­
tions . 
A program might be devised whose solution would yield this optimum. 
Such a program would pool the two separate program's items: 
$100,000 
The subsequent pooled program optimum is the same optimum solution 
that examination of the program sums would yield. Consider the sum 
optimum and the pooled optimum group and budget distributions shown in 
Table 10. 
It is obvious that, so long as all P^'s are 1 or 0 and there is only 
one 0 < P? < 1, any solution for the sum programs Z^ = Z^ + Z^ is also 
P 0 1 
possible for the Z program. However, where the Z and Z optima each 
P D 
Maximize: Z = E ^ B. 
D i 1 
Subject to: EE C? P? 
D i 1 1 
0 < P? < 1 
— 1 — 
«IT 
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Table 10. Sum-pooled options comparison 
Sum 
Methods 
OJT IT Pooled 
Groups 
Budget $70,000 $30,000 $100,000 
Objective 
maximizes = Z B? P? i l l  
= I B] pJ 
i l l  
zf = Z Z B? P? 
D i l l  
have a 0 < P^ < 1, the tF would have at most a single 0 < P^ < 1. 
Following the earlier benefit-cost final solution, this implies that, 
relative to the sum program, the pooled optimum that includes the same fully 
funded activities as the sum program Increases the funding of the partially 
funded activity with the higher benefit-cost ratio. Thus the pooled 
optimum has a higher value than the optimum sum program. Further, due to 
the given budget distribution for a sum program, the optimum sum may involve 
funding an activity with a benefit-cost ratio lower than would the pooled 
program fund over the same activities with the flexible budget allocation. 
For an example, see Table 11. 
For a given budget for a given distribution of training groups among 
programs, the optimum of the pooled program will be equal to or larger than 
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Table 11. Optima under sum and pooled programs 
Sum 
OJT IT Pooled 
Group BJ/CJ < Group B^/c; 4 Group BJ/CJ < 
1^ 2.0 40000 1 i: 1.6 10000 1 1° 2.0 40000 1 
2° 1.5 70000 0 2^ 1.1 60000 0 1: 1.6 10000 0 
3° 1.8 20000 1 3: 1.3 40000 1/8 2° 1.5 70000 0 
4° 1.7 50000 1/5 4^ 1.9 15000 1 2: 1.1 60000 0 
3° 1.8 20000 1 
3: 1.3 40000 0 
4O 1.7 50000 1/2 
4: 1.9 15000 1 
Budget $70,000 
Z° $133,000 
$184,000 
Budget $30,000 
$51,000 
Budget $100,000: 
OJT $ 85,000 
IT $ 15,000 
Z pooled $187,000 
the optimum sum program. 
Finally, consider the shifting of trainees from one type of training to 
another: changes in the homogeneous group-trainee program distribution. 
The optimum here is the top level optimum considering all possible distri­
butions of trainee groups among types of training for all possible budget 
distributions of a given budget. 
Take as a starting point a pooled program optimum; i.e., an optimum 
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derived by considering all possible budget distributions for a given group-
program distribution. Any increase in the program payoff must come from a 
change in the group-program distribution. For example, trainees in group 
one may be shifted from potential OJT entrants to potential IT program 
entrants. Changes within groups are independent of changes in the other 
groups. Thus, in Table 9, the distribution of group one might be changed 
from 0.5 potential OJT trainees and 0.5 potential IT trainees to 0.3 OJT 
and 0.7 IT trainees without affecting the other group distributions. The 
impact upon the payoff of the linear program for such a shift depends on the 
benefit-cost ratios of the program group involved directly and the benefit-
cost ratios of groups affected indirectly. The indirect effects are 
induced fay the fixed budget requirement. These effects are shown below 
for a within group shift in proportion of E from potential OJT entrants 
(subgroup i^) to potential IT entrants (subgroup i^). 
. 0  1 ; 
Change in payoff (Zp) and budget (M) for a shift of E out of funded 
iT 
AM° = (C°^)(-E) 
The corresponding payoff and budget effects for the shift of E into 
a funded i^ are: 
AZp - (E)(C^ ) flT . 
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= (E)(cJ^) 
'file cost adjustment would be made in the marginally (last) funded 
group (i ) : 
AM^ = (E)(cJ^ - cj^). 
AZp = (E)(cJ 
JÏ 
T 
T 
The change in the optimum (AZp) is the total of the shift effects. 
AzJ = AZ° +AzJ + AZ^ 
0 1 M 
AZp = (-E)(C° ) fiT + (E)(cJ ) ^  + E(C° - ^ 
li 
iT iT T 
AZJ - E - 3°,) + (Cj, - 4) ^ 
T 
The budget is unchanged. 
AM^ = AM*^ + AM^ + 0 . . AM" 
0 s . V , „I AM^ = (-E)(C.y) + E(C.^) + (E)(C.^-C.^) = 0 
T 
If AZp = Û, the program is indifferent between the two distributions. 
T 
Should AZp > 0,the shift will be a move toward the top level optimum. 
T 
Should AZp < 0, a reverse shift of E would be called for if the criterion 
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were symmetrical. That it is asymmetrical will be shown later below. 
T 
The AZp can be utilized to move from one optimum for a given distribu­
tion to another optimum for another distribution. Determine an optimum 
for a given budget and group-program distribution. For each group i 
T 
calculate the AZp shown in the generalized form: 
AZJ - E (CJj - 4) ^  
T 
where: 
K = program into which the potential trainees are to be shifted, 
L = program from which the trainees are to be shifted, 
M = marginal program in which the cost adjustment is made. 
K L 
Where i.e., where the cost adjustment requires fewer to be 
trained in the marginal group, the maximum E shift (Egg) for which the 
T 
AZp' criterion is unbiased is derived: 
:SG (ClT - + I'M C* = 0 c" = 4) 
SG . L _ K 
(C^T 
If i.e., the cost adjustment requires a greater proportion to 
be trained in the marginal group, the maximum E shift (Egg) becomes: 
^GS ^^iT ~ ^ iT^ ~ ^ ^ 
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Shifts of less than or must be made if the remaining proportion of 
the subgroup to be shifted (E^) is less than E^^ or E^^. 
T 
Shifts of E > Egg must have a calculated criterion value, AZp, larger 
than the true value if the next highest program has a higher benefit-cost 
ratio;B^^ . Shifts for which E > E^g by similar reasoning have a calculated 
Thm 
T 
value that may understate the true program optimum change because the next 
program to be funded may have a benefit-cost ratioless than that of 
the original marginal groups. In each case the resultant bias is an 
increasing function of the E excess over the limit and the variation in 
the benefit-cost ratios. 
T 
There would be no bias of course if the AZp were computed with a 
budget correction factor in which the changes in marginal group funding 
were weighted by their benefit-cost ratios. Thus it is evident that the 
T 
criterion is asymmetrical. Negative AZ^ may not indicate the proper E shift 
T in the opposite direction, AZ^ may even be positive. 
An unbiased program routine could be written, but it would involve a 
T T 
great deal of compilation for each AZp iteration. Further, a AZp calcula­
tion would be necessary for each type of training for each group. The 
calculation for only two types of training per group would be far fewer 
T 
than for several types of training. The AZp's required for n groups i with 
n (M )(M -1) 
M. types of training per group would be i i for each step 
1 1—1 2 
toward the top level optimum. Two algorithms allow a more rapid stepwise 
approach toward the optimum allocation of training resources. For a given 
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budget both will simultaneously determine the group-program distribution 
and the proportion of each group to be trained. 
The first method uses the linear programming algorithm entirely. 
Maximize: Z = Z P® + P^) 
Subject to; Z pj + pj) = M 
0 < pj + P^ < 1 
— i i — 
0 < P ? < 1  0  <  P ^  <  1  
— i — — i — 
The symbols have been defined in the earlier analysis. 
The second method utilizes an algorithm very similar to the procedure 
developed for the shifting of a proportion E of trainees from one training 
program to another. The algorithm and a distribution problem are developed 
in the Appendix to this chapter. The procedure is shown below: 
Step One - For a given budget and group-program distribution calculate a 
simplex optimum solution or select an optimum via a ranking. 
Step Two - Designate marginal and next marginal items. 
Step Three - Designate all interesting shifts. 
Step Four - Calculate the marginal cost adjustment constraints. The 
relevant formulas are in Appendix B. 
Step Five - Calculate E constraints from cost constraints. (See 
Appendix B) 
Step Six - Calculate maximum distribution shifts of E. (See Appendix B) 
Step Seven - Choose the smaller E and compute the associated AZp. (See 
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Appendix B) 
Step Eight - Determine maximum AZ^ and shift. 
Step Nine - Repeat process until all AZp < 0, i.e., there are no more 
interesting shifts. 
The simplex algorithm yields the same optimum as does the shift 
algorithm. The simplex method is applied to the problem in the appendix 
used to illustrate the shift algorithm. Both methods yield the same 
optimum solution. 
The algorithms are very similar in their stepwise procedure for move­
ment to an optimum allocation. The simplex "phase one" search for a basic 
feasible solution corresponds to the step one simplex or ranking optimum 
for a given group program distribution. Both phase one and step one result 
in feasible solutions for the overall problem. Neither of these need be 
top level optimal, but they might be. If the feasible solution is not 
optimal both algorithms proceed in stepwise fashion to reach the top level 
optimum. 
The stepwise movement differs between the two algorithms. In the 
simplex phase two, the program activity to be added is designated by the 
most negative relative cost factor. The level at which this activity enters 
depends upon the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the entering 
activity and the basic activities and is limited by the amount a basic 
activity can be decreased (the Constant/MRS coefficient "Ratio"). The 
maximum activity level for the new activity is the minimum that exhausts 
one of the basic activities. Thus the entering activity is chosen on the 
basis of the largest objective function increase, but the entrance level 
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and hence the objective function change is not known until the constraints 
are examined. Then the magnitude of the effect upon the objective function 
can be determined, and this determines the effect on other basic activity 
levels. 
The shift algorithm first determines the set of possible activity 
level changes ("interesting shifts"). This is similar to determining the 
set of basic activities. The maximum possible shift for each interesting 
shift is determined by the use of cost-constraints. The resultant effect 
upon the objective function is then determined. 
The shift yielding the largest objective function change thus deter­
mines the entering activity or changes in the level of existing activities. 
However, there need not be a deletion of a basic activity, it may change 
only in magnitude. Here neither the entering activity nor the level of 
change is known until after changes in the objective function are deter­
mined. The test for optlmality in the simplex algorithm requires all 
relative cost factors to be non-negative. The shift algorithm criterion is 
similar in that no calculation need be made to determine that no inter­
esting shifts remain to be made. 
An interesting conclusion emerges from the contrast of the two 
algorithms. If a hierarchy is formed consisting of the highest benefit-
cost ratio in each set of mutually exclusive group-program activities, the 
optimum is reached by funding down the hierarchy until the budget is 
exhausted. That this is true is shown below: 
L K L K 
AZ_ = (-E) (C) ^  + (E) (C%) flT + (E) (C% - CJ fiT 
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AC = (-E) (C^^) + E (C^^) + E - 0 
c^T = (tr - (C%T - c^r) 
< i^i 4 
b" 
At the maximum values of IT and T i.e., iT , the value of AZ is zero. 
C^' ^ cf iT S iT 
Thus, for every group that has one or more types of training program 
involved in the first feasible solution, the optimum will be approached by 
funding totally the mutually exclusive training option with the highest 
benefit-cost ratio. For the nonmutually exclusive groups, the problem 
reverts to the first linear program approach—fund fully the option with 
the largest benefit-cost ratio until the budget is exhausted. 
The previous methodology can be expanded to allow allocation of 
homogeneous groups among several training options within each type of 
training. For instance, the first group may have available to it training 
by OJT for nurse's aides, drill press operators and fry cooks, draftsmen 
and spray painters. The methodology does not require duplication of 
training options for types of training among programs. It only requires 
knowledge of the nature of the relationship: independent or mutually 
exclusive. 
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Summary 
This chapter has suggested aii alternative to benefit-cost allocation 
of training resources. Discriminant analysis can be combined with a 
decision rule formulation to allocate resources among groups of trainees 
or on a per person referral basis. Several degrees of freedom are allowed 
the analyst in both the definition of success and decision role stages of 
the analysis. 
Once a socially desirable set of information on benefits and costs of 
training program alternatives has been gathered, a linear program approach 
to resource allocation can be followed. Depending upon how one fulfills 
the independent items requirement, two algorithms may be used to reach an 
optimal allocation. The simplex and shift algorithms lead to the same top 
level optimum via very similar paths. They differ primarily in the method 
of stepwise movement from a feasible solution to the top level optimum. The 
simplex moves from entering activity to activity level. The shift algorithm 
determines the level and activity at the same time after scanning all 
possible shifts. The shift algorithm may take several iterations to delete 
a basic activity. For this reason it may solve more slowly than the 
simplex algorithm given the same initial solution. 
The method may be expanded to handle the situation with numerous 
training occupational options for each training group for each type of 
training. The optimal resource allocation may be achieved by either 
algorithm or by the benefit-cost hierarchy funding technique. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The tasks this thesis set out to accomplish included a definition of 
benefit-cost analysis from conceptualization through measurement, a 
synthesis of approaches toward the measurement process, and the exploration 
of an alternative to and an extension of benefit-cost analysis. 
Benefit-cost analysis is an aid to the decision-making process. The 
end product is a condensation of information about the impact of an 
activity upon a set of variables that theoretically represent society or a 
meaningful subset of .society. The analyst charged with such a mission 
attempts to answer a series of questions over what amounts to four steps 
in benefit-cost analysis. 
The problem delineation step entails the definition of basic and hybrid 
activities and of reasonable projects for these activities. The effects 
streams resulting from such activities are social system variable magnitudes 
that are the result of the process. The variables for which the activity 
is defined are direct effects; all others are stemming indirect effects. 
This first step has been illustrated for MDTA programs. 
Effects definition requires a model of the social system or a system 
subset such as the economic system. In the absence of a complete general 
equilibrium model encompassing all relevant variables, the analyst generally 
proceeds with a partial equilibrium analysis or selects what he deems 
"important" variates. The streams of effects are variously classed as 
direct, indirect, primary, secondary, internal and external. Primary 
effects are target or intended direct or indirect effects. Secondary 
effects are precipitant attendant effects. Internal effects are person 
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specific. They impinge upon those for whom the activity was intended. 
External effects are those social system disturbances that do not have a 
direct feedback, upon the projects* initiators or intended recipients. 
These are categorized as technological effects upon system efficiency and 
equity and pecuniary external effects upon equity. 
Time is a significant magnitude of each effect. The treatment of the 
intertemporal variable magnitudes depends upon the form of information the 
decision rule can utilize. Streams may have a finite or infinite horizon. 
Generally these intertemporal magnitudes are reduced to common denominator 
time via discounting to present value. The choice of discount rate raises 
questions of propriety due to its impact on the total level of investment 
and its public-private mix. 
The decision rule separates effects into positive and negative effects 
by social welfare connotation. A Pareto-optimal approach can be used to 
classify the direction of relationships between variables changes and social 
welfare changes even if the actual conditions for Pareto optimal moves are 
rarely met. If more than a weak decision rule is to be developed, then 
the analyst must weight activity effects in addition to deciding upon the 
proper effects to include in the decision rule and upon their relationships 
to social welfare. Common denominators may be any of the decision rule 
variates. Most generally the unit of exchange becomes the common denomina­
tor. All effects are measured in units of exchange either via their actual 
impact upon a particular market or their imputed market effect. Unfortu­
nately this approach potentially underestimates the magnitude of most 
variables. 
The actual measurement process follows one of two basic approaches to 
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quantify the effects streams from training. The pre-post methodology 
assumes pretraining experience to continue indefinitely into the future 
without training. The problems of temporarily high and low pretraining 
variable magnitudes and undeleted exogenous effects, for example the 
business cycle, are manifest here. The second main approach is composed 
of a couple of control group benchmarks from which to judge training 
program impact. Control groups stratified by trainee-program relationship 
can be used to establish hypothetical upper and lower limits to project 
effects. It makes an allowance for cyclical variation, but suffers from 
the neurosis of nonidentical controls and nontrainee control groups are 
often difficult to gather. 
All approaches are in danger of perpetrating the methodological fault: 
the fallacy of composition. External and secondary effects prejudice the 
extropolation of effects from the trainees to society as a whole. Most of 
the variables examined held both the possibility for external effects and, 
depending upon the decision rule utilized, the exclusion accorded secondary 
effects. 
The primary sources of evaluative data are the Department of Labor 
banks of data gathered prior to, during and after training. Social 
Security data, U.S. Employment Service files, and interviews. Department 
of Labor data contains data on the greatest number of variables, but early 
data tends to be incomplete and follow ups are somewhat erratic for 
training completers and nonexistent for noncompleters. These are still the 
best single source of information however. Social Security data, when 
access may be gained to it, is collected on an income range and exclude 
some types of employees. The U.S. Employment Service records have provided 
98 
data on employment, income and transfers and are a source of control group 
members. In-depth data tailored to the analyst's needs can be accumulated 
via interviews. While most accurate and complete of the data sources, it 
is also the most expensive. The surveys are made of a sample of the 
population of trainees. The sample is biased toward less mobile trainees 
due to time lags in locational information in Department of Labor files. 
Mail questionnaires have not achieved high response records. Further, 
interview response errors have been estimated at five percent of yearly 
earnings. 
The approaches toward effects meacurement attempt to duplicate the 
ideal where society runs the same time span twice to measure with and 
without project effects. The experimental design is the best duplicator 
of the ideal. This random treatment assignment to identical groups has 
been criticized on two grounds. First, the experimental sample does not in 
practice consist of identical persons. It is, however, the closest of the 
measurement approaches to the ideal. Nonidentical controls is a hindrance 
but does not preclude use of the design. The design overstates gains to 
training when trainees and controls both are eligible for jobs due to 
increased aggregate demand that would previously have been vacant for 
structural reasons, and which trainees fill as a result of their training 
certificate. Training for shortage occupations limits the extent of such 
unknowable transfer effects. The Goldfarb analytic approach may be 
expanded to examine the experimental design and the pre-post approaches 
toward measurement of training effects. Table 8 (page 56) is being repeated 
as Table 12 to show the results of this endeavor. 
Table 12. Control group bias by environment (same as Table 8 on page 56) 
Pre-post design Experimental design 
Case Environment 
Training gain 
measurement Reason 
Training gain 
measurement Reason 
II. 
HI. 
Strict structural 
unemployment 
Increased aggregate 
demand 
A. Goldfarb 
assumption 
B. Equal 
opportunity 
Mixed vacancies 
A. Job rationing 
Higher structural 
present value 
Lower structural 
present value 
B. No job rationing 
Higher structural 
present value 
Lower structural 
present value 
Exact 
Overes timate 
Overestimate 
Overestimate or 
exact 
Overestimate 
Overestimate 
Overestimate 
Transfer effect 
Exact 
Overes timate Transfer effect 
No correction for Exact 
aggregate demand 
No correction for 
aggregate demand 
No correction for Exact 
aggregate demand 
No correction for Exact 
aggregate demand, 
and underestimates 
opportunity cost 
No correction for Exact 
aggregate demand 
Underestimate Overestimate of 
opportunity cost 
Table 12. (Continued) 
Pre-post design Experimental design 
Training gain Training gain 
Case Environment measurement Reason measurement Reason 
IV. Mixed vacancies, 
multiple present 
values 
A. No job rationing 
B. Job rationing 
Overes timate 
Overestimate or 
exact 
No correction for 
aggregate demand, 
and underestimates 
opportunity cost 
No correction for 
aggregate demand 
Exact 
Underes timate Overestimate of 
opportunity cost 
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From the societal point of view the relevant question is whether jobs 
vacated by trainees would or would not be filled by others. Failure to 
discern such differences causes overstatement of opportunity costs. The 
problems delineated for income measurement also pertain to the measurement 
of the other variables. There are three major negative factors: dis­
ruption, wage, and alienation effects. Only alienation effects can be 
allowed for in the control group design, but their magnitude cannot be 
determined. 
Identical controls and rate range rationalization are problems for 
approaches using the stratified control group approach. Nonmeasured 
appearance and motivation, and rarely measured ability variates bias group 
selection. Whether training completers taking nontraining related jobs do 
so because of higher motivation and ability or as a result of losing in the 
employment-of-the-fittest contest determine whether this group is an upper 
or lower bound for training project effects. Transfer effects considera­
tions would tend to make this group's results a lower bound. 
The nontraining-associated control groups can be questioned on the 
grounds of likeness to the trainees, but they are closer to the ideal 
experimental method than the stratification methodology. 
Market adjustment lags by occupation are generally unmeasured. The 
time element involved in labor supply and demand adjustment hampers correct 
measurement of effects. Displacement effects are a major problem confronting 
all measurement schemes. They place an ever greater emphasis upon the need 
to quantify and include the variates now neglected as unmeasured effects 
for these may overweigh transfer effects. 
The fourth chapter explored the use of discriminant analysis as an 
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alternative to benefit-cost analysis. Discriminant analysis utilizes 
trainee and training variables to separate potential training successes 
from failures. When combined with a decision rule, it has the virtue of 
flexibility at two levels. The definition of success may be made as 
stringent as the analyst desires so long as the discriminant function 
remains statistically significant. Once the discriminant function has been 
estimated, a decision rule for allocative efficiency may be formulated 
utilizing the estimated function. 
Potential trainees might be classed as potential successes, failures, 
or uncertain outcomes. The decision rule may then designate the extent to 
which training would proceed on the basis of these classifications. Or, 
utilizing less stringent definitions of success, one might utilize deviations 
from the class boundaries to allocate training resources. This method 
also allows allocation on a continuous referral basis. Successful use of 
this analysis depends, as does benefit-cost analysis, upon extensive data 
on the training process and trainee. 
The Hardin and Borus analysis of interaction effects holds promise 
for allocative efficiency. The end product of the multiple regression 
search techniques would allow the separation of potential trainees into 
homogeneous groups specified by trainee, training occupation, and labor 
market. 
The benefit and cost information relevant to each of these groups can 
then be utilized in a linear programming framework to allocate a budget. 
Where the allocation is over independent groups, the final iteration yields 
the same answer as would benefit-cost analysis. The group with the highest 
benefit-cost ratio is funded, then the group with the next highest 
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benefit-cost ratio and so on until the budget is exhausted. The allocation 
can be expanded to consider a problem of allocating a budget over homo­
geneous trainee groups with numerous mutually exclusive training options. 
The problem is to pick the optimum group-program distribution from all 
possible budget allocations over all possible group-program distributions. 
The linear program requirement of independent items (training group options) 
can be met by specifying a group-training distribution, and shifting to 
other distribution optima toward the top level optimum. Or, it can be met 
by formulating a pooled program objective function with total groups as the 
independent items. The two algorithms yield the same solution. The phase 
one search for a feasible solution for the algorithms corresponds to an 
initial group-program distribution optimum. The stepwise movement from 
the initial feasible solution (optimum) to the top level optimum differs 
for the two algorithms. The simplex move is determined from the entering 
activity (from relative cost factors) to the entrance level (minimum to 
delete a basic activity). The shift algorithm moves from cost constraints 
to simultaneously determine the change in the activity and its magnitude. 
Further, the optimum change for the shift algorithm may not delete a basic 
activity. A larger number of iterations may be required than for the simplex 
approach, so the shift algorithm may take longer to reach solution. The 
methodology can be expanded to include numerous training options for each 
group. Finally, it can be shown that the optimal solution obtained through 
the use of both algorithms can also be reached using the benefit-cost 
hierarchy funding technique. 
104 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ando, Albert. Introduction. In Ando, A., Fisher, F. M. and Simon, H. A. 
Essays on the structure of social science models. Pp. 1-4. Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press. 1963. 
Bakke, E. Wight. Government's manpower role. Industrial Relations Research 
Assoc. Proc. 20: 155-160. 1967. 
Baumol, William J. On the social rate of discount. American Economic 
Review 58: 788-802. 1968. 
Baumol, William J. On the social rate of discount: comment on the 
comments. American Economic Review 59: 930. 1969. 
Besen, Stanley M., Fechter, Alan E. and Fisher, Anthony C. Cost-effec­
tiveness analysis for the "War on Poverty". In Goldman, Thomas A., 
ed. Cost-effectiveness analysis; new approaches in decision making. 
Pp. 140-154. New York, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher. 
1967. 
Blume, Paul Rountree. An evaluation of institutional vocational training 
received by American Indians through the Muskogee Oklahoma Area Office 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Still­
water, Oklahoma, Library, Oklahoma State University. 1968. 
Borus, Michael E. The economic effectiveness of retraining the unemployed. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Report No. 35. 1966. 
Borus, Michael E. Response error in survey reports of earnings information. 
Journal of American Statistical Association 61: 729-739. 1966. 
Borus, Michael E. Time trends in benefits from retraining in Connecticut. 
Industrial Relations Research Association Proceedings 20: 36-46. 1967. 
Brummet, H. L., Flamholtz, E. G., and Pyle, W. C. Human resource myopia. 
Monthly Labor Review 92, No. 1: 29-30. Jan. 1969. 
Buchanan, James and Stubblebine, William C. Externality. Economia N. S. 
29: 371-384. 1962. 
Cain, Glen C. and Hollister, Robinson G. The methodology of evaluating 
social action programs. Discussion Papers. Madison, Wisconsin, Insti­
tute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin. 1969. 
Cain, Glen C. and Stromsdorfer, E. W. An economic evaluation of government 
retraining programs in West Virginia. In Somers, Gerald G., ed. 
Retraining the unemployed. Pp. 299-335. Madison, Wisconsin, 
University of Wisconsin Press. 1968. 
105 
Capron, William A. Cost-effectiveness analysis for government domestic 
programs. In Goldman, Thomas A., ed. Cost effecLiveness analysis; 
new approaches in decision making. Pp. 131-139. New York, New York, 
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers. 1967. 
Chamberlain, Neil W. Some second thoughts on the concept of human capital. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 20: 1-13. Dec. 1967, 
Danidre, Andre. "Rate of return" vs "manpower approach" in educational 
planning. Public Policy 14: 161-200. 1965. 
Dantzig, George B. Linear programming and extensions. Princeton, New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1963. 
Eckaus, R. S. Economic criteria for education and training. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 46: 181-190. 1964. 
Ferman, Louis and Harvey, Scott. Job retraining in Michigan. In Somers, 
Gerald G., ed. Retraining the unemployed. Pp. 213-255. Madison, 
Sic., University of Wisconsin Press. 1968. 
Gibbard, Harold A. and Sommers, Gerald G. Government retraining of the 
unemployed in West Virginia. In Somers, Gerald G., ed. Retraining 
the unemployed. Pp. 17-124. Madison, Wis,, University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1968, 
Goldfarb, Robert S, The evaluation of government programs: the case of 
New Haven's manpower training activities, Yale Economic Essays 9: 
59-104, Fall 1969, 
Gordon, Margaret S. Critical evaluation of three manpower reports: 
discussion. Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 19: 57-63. 
1966. 
Gordon, Margaret S. Retraining programs at home and abroad. Industrial 
Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 128-138. 1964. 
Harbison, Frederick. Critical issues in manpower policy and practice. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 216-229. 1964. 
Hardin, Einar and Borus, Michael E. Economic benefits and costs of 
retraining courses in Michigan. East Lansing, Michigan, School of 
Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University. 1969. 
Hardin, Einar and Borus, Michael E. An economic evaluation of the 
retraining program in Michigan: some methodological problems of 
research. American Statistical Assoc., Social Statistics Section, 
Proc. 1966: 133-137. 1966. 
James, Estelle. On the social rate of discount: comment. American 
Economic Review 59: 912-916. 1969. 
106 
Kaizuka, Kelmel. Public goods and decentralization of production. Review 
of Economics and Statistics 47: 118-120. 1965. 
Kreps, Jaunlta M. Manpower and welfare programs: benefit-cost analysis. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 203-216. 1964. 
Kuenne, R. E. The theory of general economic equilibrium. Princeton, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1963. 
Landauer, Carl. On the social rate of discount; comment. American Economic 
Review 59: 917-918. 1969. 
Lester, Richard A. The role and limits of national manpower policy. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 18: 55-58. 1965. 
Levltan, Sar A. Evaluation of national manpower policies: discussion. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 149-152. 1964. 
MacDonald, John S. Benefit-cost analysis of social welfare programs. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 186-194. 1964. 
Main, Earl D. A nationwide evaluation of MDTA institutional job training. 
Journal of Human Resources 3: 159-170. 1968. 
Mangum, Garth L. Contributions and costs of manpower development and 
training. Ann Arbor, Michigan, School of Labor and Industrial 
Relations, University of Michigan. 1967. 
Mangum, Garth L. Critical Issues in American manpower policy and practices; 
discussion. Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 230-233. 
1964. 
Mangum, Garth L. The emergence of a manpower policy. New York, New York, 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc. 1969. 
Mangum, Garth L. Evaluating federal manpower programs. Industrial 
Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 20: 161-171. 1967. 
McCandles, Boyd R. Children and adolescents. New York, New York, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1961. 
McKean, Roland. Efficiency in government through systems analysis. New 
York, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1958. 
Mulr, A. H., Appleton, L. M., Kaplan, M. A. and Knight, C. H. Cost/ 
effectiveness analysis of on-the-job and Institutional training courses. 
Washington, D.C., Office of Manpower, Policy, Evaluation, and Research, 
Manpower Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor. 1967. 
Musgrave, Richard A. Cost-benefit analysis and the theory of public 
finance. Journal of Economic Literature 7: 797-806. 1969. 
107 
Mushkin, Selma. Manpower and welfare programs: benefit-cost analysis 
discussion. Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 206-210. 
1964. 
Nichols, Alan. On the social rate of discount: comment. American 
Economic Review 59: 909-911. 1969. 
Page, David A. Retraining under the MDTA: a cost-benefit analysis. 
Public Policy 13: 257-267. 1964. 
P.L. 87-27, May 1, 1961, 75 Stat. 47; 72 Stat. 697; 42 U.S.C. 2501-2525. 
P.L. 87-415, Mar. 15, 1962, 76 Stat. 23, as amended by (a) P.L. 87-729, 
Oct. 1, 1962, 76 Stat. 679, (b) P.L. 88-214, Dec. 19, 1963, 77 Stat. 
422, (c) P.L. 89-15, Apr. 26, 1965, 79 Stat. 75, (d) P.L. 89-792, 
Nov. 7, 1966, 80 Stat. 1434, (e) P.L. 89-794, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 
1451, and (f) P.L. 90-636, Oct. 24, 1968, 82 Stat. 1352; 42 U.S.C. 
2571-2628. 
Planning Research Corporation. Program analysis manual to support a 
planning-programming-budgeting system. Washington, D.C., Manpower 
Administration, U.S. Dept. of Labor. 1966. 
Prest, A. R. and Turvey, R. Theories of cost-benefit analysis. In 
American Economic Association, Royal Economic Society. Surveys of 
economic theory. Vol. 3. Pp. 155-207. New York, New York, St. 
Martin's Press, Inc. 1967. 
Ramsey, David. On the social rate of discount: comment. American 
Economic Review 59: 919-924. 1969. 
Rasmussen. Dale. Determinants of rates of return to investment in OJT. 
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Dallas, Texas, Library, Southern Methodist 
University. 1969. 
Robie, Edward. Manpower and its education and training: discussion. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 20: 51-56. 1967. 
Samuelson, Paul A. The pure theory of public expenditures. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 36: 387-389. 1954. 
Sewell, David 0. A critique of cost-benefit analyses of training. Monthly 
Labor Review 90: 45-51. 1967. 
Simon, Herbert A. Causal ordering and indentiflability. In Ando, A., 
Fisher, F. M. and Simon, H. A. Essays on the structure of social 
science models. Pp. 5-31, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 1963. 
Soffer, Benson. Manpower and welfare programs: benefit-cost analysis; 
discussion. Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 210-214. 
1960. 
108 
Soiie, Richard J. An evaluation of the effects of retraining in Tennessee. 
In Somers, Gerald, Ed. Retraining the unemployed. Pp. 193-211. 
Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin Press. 1968. 
Somers, Gerald G. Evaluation of manpower development programs. In 
Jakubauskas, Edward B. and Baumel, C. Phillip, eds. Human resources 
development. Pp. 143-152. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press. 
1967. 
Somers, Gerald G. Research methodology in the evaluation of retraining 
programmer. International Labor Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 
Labor and Automation Bulletin 1: 187-207. 1964. 
Somers, Gerald G. Retraining: an evaluation of gains and costs. In Ross, 
Arthur M., ed. Employment policy and the labor market. Pp. 271-298. 
Berkeley, California, University of California Press. 1965. 
Somers, Gerald G., ed. Retraining the unemployed. Madison, Wis., Univer­
sity of Wisconsin Press. 1968. 
Somers, Gerald G. and McKechnie, Graeme H. Vocational retraining programs 
for the unemployed. Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 20; 
25-35. 1967. 
Somers, Gerald G. and Stromsdorfer, Ernst. A benefit-cost analysis of 
manpower retraining. Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17; 
172-185. 1964. 
Somers, Gerald G. and Wood, W. D. Cost-benefit analysis of manpower 
policies. North American Conference Proceedings. Madison, Wis., 
Centre for Studies in Vocational and Technical Education, University 
of Wisconsin. 1969. 
Stromsdorfer, Ernst. Determinants of economic success in retraining the 
unemployed; the West Virginia experiance. Journal of Human Resources 
3; 139-158. 1968. 
Swift, William J. and Weisbrod, Burton A. On the monetary value of 
education's intergeneration effects. Journal of Political Economy 73; 
643-649. 1965. 
Taylor, David P. Manpower and its education and training; discussion. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 20; 57-59. 1967. 
Tintner, Gerhard. Econometrics. New York, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc. 1952. 
Trooboff, Benjamin M. Employment experience after MDTA training. Atlanta, 
Georgia, Center for Manpower Studies, Atlanta University. 1968. 
109 
U.S. Department of Labor. Manpower report of the president. Pp. 219-224. 
1969. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Report of the Secretary of Labor on research 
and training activities under the MDTA. 1963. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Report of the Secretary of Labor on research 
and training activities under the MDTA. 1964. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Manpower Administration. The influence of MDTA 
training on earnings. Manpower Evaluation Report 8. 1968. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Manpower Administration. Manpower research 
projects. 1969. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Manpower Administration. Bureau of Employment 
Security. Employment Service. Dictionary of occupational titles. 
3rd ed. 1965. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Manpower Administration. Office of Manpower 
Research. Manpower research priority issues. 1970. 
Usher, Dan. On the social rate of discount: comment. American Economic 
Review 59: 925-929. 1969. 
Weber, Arnold R. The role and limits of national manpower policy. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 18: 32-50. 1965. 
Weisbrod, Burton A. Conceptual issues in evaluating training programs. 
Monthly Labor Review 89: 1091-1097. 1966. 
Weisbrod, Burton A. Income redistribution effects and benefit-cost 
analysis. In Chase, Samuel B., Jr., ed. Problems in public expendi­
ture analysis. Pp. 177-209. Washington, B.C., The Brookings 
Institution. 1968. 
Zeisel, J. S. Evaluation of national manpower policies: discussion. 
Industrial Relations Research Assoc. Proc. 17: 152-154. 1964. 
110 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to Dr. Edward B. 
Jakubauskas for his encouragement and assistance during the preparation of 
this study. The author also wishes to express gratitude to Dr. Harold W. 
Davey, Dr. Robert W. Thomas, Jr., Dr. H. T. David, and Dr. Donald G. 
Zytowski for their comments and suggestions for improvement of the earlier 
chapter drafts. 
The financial assistance extended to the author by the Department of 
Labor through the manpower institutional grant to the Industrial Relations 
Center of Iowa State University is gratefully acknowledged. 
Appreciation is also extended to Mrs. Beverly Allfree for her typing 
of the final draft and to Donna Wallace and Susan Wenell for their 
assistance in the duplication of the final draft. 
Finally, I express my deepest appreciation to my wife, Susan, for her 
patience and assistance throughout the preparation of this dissertation. 
Ill 
APPENDIX A. 
VARIABLES, DEFINITIONS, AND RELATIONSHIP TO SOCIAL WELFARE 
This appendix discusses variables that would be included in a benefit-
cost analysis of MDTA training programs. The first section examines 
definitions and measures for this subset of social and economic variates. 
Definitions and Measures 
Employment 
Definition: Engagement in the process of production. (Utilization of 
skill and education in the process of production.) 
Measures: (for labor resources) 
Aggregate Level: 
1. Number of persons employed (at a particular time, over time). 
2. Manhours of labor input per standard time period. 
3. Percentage of the labor force employed. 
Individual Level: 
1. Manhours per standard time period. 
2. Percentage of time employed per standard time period. 
Unemployment 
Definition: Undesired disengagement from the production process. 
Aggregate Level; 
1. Number of persons per time period. 
2. Manhours unutilized per standard time period. 
3. Percentage of the labor force. 
4. Percentage of available hours. 
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Types : 
1. Structural. 
2. Insufficient aggregate demand. 
Individual: 
1. Manhours per standard time period. 
2. Percentage of time in labor force. 
Unemployment will be dropped from explicit consideration at this point as 
redundant to employment for a specific set of trainees. 
Underemployment 
Definition: Resource engagement in the production process at less than its 
capabilities. 
Measures: (for labor resources) 
Aggregate: 
1. Manhours per standard time period. 
2. Production differential per standard time period. 
3. Capabilities differential - derived from Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles specifications. 
4. Number of persons underemployed. 
Individual: 
1. Manhours per standard time period. 
2. Wage differential per standard time period. 
3. Capabilities differential. 
Types : 
1. Structural. 
2. Insufficient aggregate demand. 
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Skill 
Definition: Specialized knowledge enabling one to perform specialized 
tasks. 
Measures : 
Aggregate: 
1. Occupational capabilities of the labor force. 
Individual: 
1. Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) specifications for 
occupations the person is capable of performing. 
2. Other tests of skills. 
3. Wage-productivity. 
4. Years of training. 
Education 
Definition: Knowledge of a general nature. 
Measures : 
Aggregate : 
1. Years of school completed by labor force or population. 
Individual: 
1. DOT general education specification for highest occupational 
capability. 
2. Test performance. 
3. Years of schooling. 
Income-Output 
Definition: Earnings of productive resources-value of final goods and 
services produced. 
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Measures: 
Aggregate : 
1. Gross National Product. 
2. Percentage of population in the definitional bounds of 
poverty. 
Individual: 
1. Earnings. 
2. Poverty proximity. 
Transfer payments 
Definition: Income accrued not on the basis of ownership and/or control 
of employed resources. 
Measures : 
Aggregate: 
1. Total dollar value of AFDC, Social Security, Unemployment 
Compensation, relief, etc. per standard time period. 
2. Number of recipients per standard time period. 
Individual: 
1. Dollar value of payments in (1) above. 
2. Recipient or nonrecipient status. 
Growth 
Definition: Rate of change of national output (income). 
Measures : 
Aggregate : 
1. Percentage change in Gross National Product or Income. 
2. Present value of output differential. 
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Inflation 
Definition: Rapid price increases for inputs and outputs. 
Measures : 
Aggregate: 
1. Price indices. 
2. Wage indices. 
3. Cost of living indices. 
Individual: Same as for aggregate above. 
Crime 
Definition: Activity not sanctioned by law. 
Measures ; 
Aggregate: 
1. Crime rate by type of crime for population per standard time 
period. 
2. Dollar value of criminal activity per standard time period. 
Individual: 
1. Type and frequency of crime per standard time period. 
2. Dollar value inference per standard time period. 
Pertinent psychological variables 
Self-esteem 
Definition: Self-concept; one's private set of expectancies, plus evalua­
tions of areas or behaviors with reference to which these expectancies are 
held. 
Measures : 
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Aggregate: 
1. Social unrest. 
Individual: 
1. Mental health (psychological testing). 
Pertinent sociological variables 
Family cohesiveness 
Definition: Stability and maintenance of family relationships. 
Measures : 
Aggregate: 
1. Divorce and separation rates. 
Individual: 
1. Family status. 
2. Age children leave home, quit school, enter labor force. 
Pertinent political variables 
Participation 
Definition: Awareness of and activity in the community political environ­
ment. 
Measures : 
Aggregate: 
1. Percentage voting in elections and referenda. 
2. Number voting in elections and referenda. 
Individual: 
1. Awareness of processes and candidates. 
2. Political action. 
3. Voting frequency. 
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Some variable changes are of a long run nature. These long run 
effects include labor force adaptability, second generation effects and 
breaking the poverty chain. All three are conglomerations of variable 
changes. They will not be considered as separate variables. They are 
considered in the estimation of a time horizon for the effects streams of 
individual variables. 
Relationship to Social and Individual Welfare 
Employment 
Individual welfare According to economic theory one must assume 
that if employment is higher that welfare is lower and thus that there is 
an inverse relationship between individual welfare and employment ceteris 
paribus. This means that an individual derives no satisfaction per se from 
the act of engaging in the production process. 
Social welfare An inverse relationship follows from above under the 
dubious assumption that engaging in the production process yields no utility 
to an individual in and of itself. Congress' specification that the MDTA 
increase employment is not directly contradictory to this it might be 
reasoned. The Act rather intends income increase, transfer payments 
reduction, decreased inflation, etc. The inverse relationship is based 
upon the rationale that choice between two options exactly alike except 
that one has a higher level of employment would be for the one with less 
employment. How heavily the employment component is weighted in the SWF 
is a more important matter. 
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Underemployment 
Individual welfare One could argue either way. An inverse rela­
tionship is postulated on the premise that there is greater disutility to 
being engaged in a production process at less than one's capabilities than 
at a higher level of capability. Ceteris paribus, one could argue that 
employment at full capacity involves more "work" and thus more disutility. 
The first premise is held here. 
Social welfare On the basis of the logic on individual welfare, 
the relationship is an inverse one. 
Skill 
Individual welfare Does the acquisition of skill in and of itself 
have the nature of a consumption good? If one must choose between two 
states and in one the individual has a higher skill level, yet everything 
including income is the same, which, from an individual viewpoint, is 
better? Assume skill acquisition is of the nature of a consumption good 
increasing utility in and of itself. It also embodies the potential for 
greater future income. Thus, there is a direct relationship. 
Social welfare The direct relationship analysis holds also for 
social states. 
Education 
Individual welfare The question argued for skill has been argued 
in benefit-cost analysis of education articles.^ Assume, as for skill, a 
^See for example, Andre Daniere. "Rate of return" vs "manpower 
approach" in educational planning. Public Policy 14: 161-200. 1965. 
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direct relationship between education and individual welfare based on 
similar reasoning. 
Social welfare On the above logic and value judgement, a direct 
relationship is postulated. 
Income 
Individual welfare Assuming the person has not achieved satiety, a 
direct relationship exists as a basic tenet of economic theory. 
Social welfare The direct relationship holds for social welfare 
also. 
Transfer payments 
Individual welfare If one assumes a social stigma attaches to the 
receipt of transfer payments, an inverse relationship must exist. 
Social welfare The relationship of directness follows from the 
above reasoning, yet, theoretically, a move toward optimality may involve 
higher tax and transfer payments to reach societal equity after achieving 
societal efficiency. The implication here, however, is for income distribu­
tion not the receipt of payments itself. 
Growth 
Individual welfare One may assume knowledge of growth in and of 
itself increases welfare as well as does the effect registered through 
Income. Thus a direct relationship exists. 
Social welfare A direct relationship exists between growth and 
social welfare using the above reasoning at the societal level. 
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Inflation 
Individual welfare Assume that inflation in and of itself is 
deleterious to an individual's well-being aside from any income effect. 
This implies money illusion. The relationship is an inverse one. 
Social welfare On the same basis inflation also has an inverse 
relationship to societal welfare. 
Crime 
Individual welfare Activities not sanctioned by society are 
adverse to individual welfare. There is an inverse relationship. One 
could argue against this from the viewpoint of the perpetrator of a criminal 
act on the basis of utility derived from inflicting pain or in flouting 
authority. 
Social welfare The above characterization of the relationship is 
less disputably an inverse one for society as a whole. 
Self-esteem 
Individual welfare A direct relationship exists on the basis that 
esteem is a positive component of utility and mental health. 
Social welfare This is also a direct relationship via similar logic. 
Family cohesiveness 
Individual welfare Assuming the family environment provides a net 
positive influence on an individual the relationship is direct. 
Social welfare Under the same assumption the relationship is 
direct socially. 
120 
Participation 
Individual welfare Assume participation has value of itself - a 
direct relationship results. One might also reason an inverse relationship 
if participation efforts resulted in frustration. 
Social welfare Direct social welfare effect. 
Potential Unit of Exchange Valuation and Bias 
Employment 
For the individual, employment means the disutility of the utilization 
of skill and education in the productive process. The value of an hour's 
employment to society and the individual is that hour's marginal product. 
For one hour less employment society and the individual lose the utility 
of consumption of the marginal product and gain the utility of not employing 
the worker's skill and education. The unit of exchange value of the 
disutility of employment for that hour is the wage rate. Thus, if two 
states are alike but for an additional hour of employment in one, the unit 
of exchange proxy for the difference in utility of the gain or an hour of 
leisure would be the wage rate. The disutility of extra hours of employ­
ment in terms of the unit of exchange utility proxy is the product of the 
wage (or a wage index) and the hours of employment differential. 
Underemployment 
Following the line of reasoning as for employment, the unit of exchange 
valuation of underemployment would be the difference in societal valuation 
of employment at full personal capacity and employment at less than full 
capacity, i.e., an income differential. 
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Skill 
There is no market for skill as a final or consumption good. It is 
valued in the employment market if it is utilized, but not if it is just 
acquired and consumed personally. Thus the unit of exchange itself 
undervalues skill. 
Education 
Education in and of itself is not valued in the market. Utilization 
of education is valued and reflected in income. 
Income 
Income, as the market value of the final goods and services that are 
produced, or alternatively, the totality of earned incomes, is already 
in terms of the unit of exchange. To the extent that utility or disutility 
of prestige attaches to its level, the unit of exchange undervalues utility. 
Transfer payments 
What is the marginal rate of substitution of the unit of exchange for 
the receipt of transfer payments? Transfer payments themselves are treated 
as income, but that is not what is desired here. It is the disutility or 
social stigma attached to their receipt. No unit of exchange value attaches 
here between changes in transfer payment income and subsequent welfare 
changes. The unit of exchange index undervalues the disutility of receipt 
of transfer payments. 
Growth 
This indicates a potential for expanding the real income for each 
individual. Potential growth could be measured in unit of exchange terms 
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by market valuing the increased output and computing the present value of 
the increased income. Knowledge of the existence of growth in and of 
itself may be of utility (business expectations). 
Crime 
Crime can be valued in units of exchange in terms of its Impact upon 
income. One might value crime according to three categories: 
1. Illicit production. Bootlegging and prostitution for instance 
could be valued as earned income and included as such. 
2. Transfers. Robbery and extortion might be viewed the same as 
transfer payments in the tabulation. 
3. Destruction of persons and property. Damage to productive human 
and physical resources could be valued in terms of foregone earnings. 
Under this system of valuation the first category would be added to income 
through returns to skill and education. Transfer payments would be 
aggregated with the other transfers. However, a certain disutility attaches 
to the activity itself so the dollar value of this category understates the 
change in utility associated with criminal activity. 
Inflation 
The impact of generally rising prices does have redistributive effects 
(part of real income change considerations) and could be directly related 
to societal welfare if persons directly felt "hurt" by it whether in real 
terms they were or not. No attempt has been made to measure this disutility 
directly in terms of the unit of exchange. 
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Psychological variables 
Self-esteem To the extent that this is a function of the wage 
rate, it is indirectly indicated in the income and employment variables. 
But it is not directly indicated in units of exchange in and of itself. 
Sociological variables 
Family cohesiveness One could place a value upon this to the 
extent that the "happy home" promotes greater education and skill acquisi­
tion by children and probably greater production by the head of the 
family. These could be calculated in higher future income streams. 
Further, decline in social workers' and lawyers* input into the activities 
associated with divorce, unstable homes, juvenile delinquency and crime 
would free these resources to other uses. 
But to the extent that family cohesiveness and tranquility are 
valued in themselves, the unit of exchange undervalues the utility changes 
associated with changes in this variable. 
Political variables 
Participation There is no overt market. No doubt it is reflected 
in the indirect effects on utility through other variables. It probably 
has a direct effect but no means can be derived at this point to impute a 
value to it in terms of the unit of exchange. 
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Measurement 
Table 13. Variable measures 
Variables ' Measures 
Employment Man hours per standard time period 
Underemployment Man hours per standard time period; skill and 
education differentials 
Skill DOT specifications; years of training 
Education DOT specifications; years of schooling 
Income Real income per standard time period per person 
Transfer payments Real value per standard time period per person; 
number of recipients 
Growth Percentage change in GNP; present value of 
increased product 
Inflation Percentage change in prices 
Crime Types of crime and values 
Self-esteem Increase in wage rate and employment 
Family cohesiveness Divorce rate, separation rate, estimated change 
in supportive services, age enter labor force 
Participation Voting frequency; knowledge of current events 
Potential External Effects for Variables 
Employment 
Numerous authors have discussed the possibility that the trainees may 
displace other workers capable of performing the jobs they are in as a 
result of training. This could be true if within the labor market: 
1. Others unemployed could take the job the trainee is trained for 
without having to be trained; 
2. Trainees drop out of the program to take jobs they otherwise would 
not have been able to take and compete with unemployed who could take the 
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job without training. 
The argument that trainees are only trained for jobs that yield a 
"reasonable expectation of employment" (occupations which have been listed 
as "shortage occupations" for some length of time by employers), if true, 
counters the first argument above, but not the second one. The existence 
of high levels of unemployment does not necessarily mean that trainees 
are in fact competing with unemployed workers. 
Workers can be structurally unemployed in the face of insufficient 
aggregate demand unemployment and in fact contribute to structural unemploy­
ment through skill and education deterioration and obsolescence over the 
time of unemployment. 
On the other hand one has what has been called the "vacuum" effect of 
training which amounts to an employment multiplier. An unemployed worker, 
upgraded to fill a bottleneck occupation, causes stemming and induced 
employment increases in complementary occupations (assuming that unemployed 
workers exist to fill these jobs). 
Underemployment 
The potential for vacuum and displacement effects is the same for 
underemployment as employment. 
Skill 
The external effects upon skill would be exerted through employment 
effects. Persons remaining unemployed due to trainees in the market would 
experience skill deterioriation and obsolescence through nonuse. Further, 
they would miss out on nonproject employer-given job training on other 
jobs. 
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i on_ 
Uue t'.) the similarity of skill and education, the external effects 
that are skill specific also apply to education. 
Income 
There would be a double effect here. One would be the change in 
employment for nontrainees resulting from the project as discussed above, 
the other a wage effect. Increasing the supply of workers for an occupa­
tion will have the result of decreasing the equilibrium price unless it is 
artificially set. Further, to the extent that the vacuum effect operates, 
the resulting increased demand for skill complements may increase the wage 
in these attendant occupations. To the extent that the trainees are 
trained for occupations as reported by employers, they have an added impetus 
toward a wage effect because it would serve the employer's interest to 
overstate his needs to drive the price of labor down. What one has here is 
a mixture of technological and pecuniary externalities. There are 
technological externalities to the extent that structural unemployment is 
overcome ^.nd pecuniary externalities to the extent that there are resultant 
wage changes. 
Numerous persons have attributed an income multiplier effect (secondary 
benefits) to training. 
Utilizing a simple Keynesian model this claim assumes that any increase 
in aggregate consumption, government expenditure, and investment resulting 
from the project would not, in fact, have occurred otherwise. With respect 
to government expenditures this is true if each analysis is a with versus 
without approach. The method of finance affects the multiplier value. 
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If taxes are raised to pay for these government expenditures, only a 
balanced budget multiplier is correct. 
If it is also assumed that there are no negative employment effects, 
then there is also a multiplier effect for the increased production 
resulting from overcoming structural unemployment. If the multiplier effect 
is used, the analyst may only count the income differential resulting from 
the overcoming of structural unemployment. In other words, for moving a 
structurally unemployed person into a skill shortage job, the correct 
addition is the multiplier times that part of the wage consumed which 
represents an increase in consumption. The analyst may not also multiply 
the wage of skill complements employed because that is part of the multi­
plier effect and would be double counting. 
For the upgrading of employees the multiplier should also be used 
against the wage differential and not the whole wage if employment increases 
are due only to the multiplier effects of skill complements. If the 
upgrading is to a job that is not a skill complement of the old job, then 
the entire wage ''zould be subject to the multiplier. 
Transfer payments 
It is doubtful that changes in transfer payments have more than 
trainee-specific effects because they are trainee specific in nature. 
Growth 
Growth accrues to the society. It is not completely reflected in the 
income effects. 
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Inflation 
Any change in inflation obviously has effects external to the 
trainees. 
Crime 
• Victims of criminal activity are subject to external effects. One 
could speculate external effects upon the community environment. 
Psychological variables 
Self-esteem There may be some demonstration effect associated with 
some members of a particular community being able or unable to make it out 
of the disadvantaged category as a result of training. Thus there could be 
negative effects or positive effects. 
Sociological variables 
Family cohesiveness As for psychological variables, there are 
probably negative and positive demonstration effects. 
Political variables 
Participation A demonstration effect could result here also. If 
political action were successful, definite secondary effects would be 
generated. 
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APPENDIX B. SIMPLEX AND SHIFT ALGORITHMS 
The logic underlying the algorithms requires for all interesting 
shifts the calculation of a maximum shift, E, constrained by the proportion 
of a subgroup not already shifted or by an amount that exhausts the 
marginal group. From the E a AZp is calculated. Selection of the largest 
AZp shift moves the program in stepwise fashion toward an optimum. 
Definitions 
Primal (P). A subgroup funded in the current optimal solution (P^ = 1). 
Nonprimal (NP). A subgroup not funded in the current optimal solution 
(P. = 0) .  
Marginal (M). A subgroup partially funded in the current solution 
(0 < P^ < 1), or the fully-funded subgroup with the lowest benefit-
cost ratio. 
Next Marginal (NM). The nonprimal subgroup that would be funded next if 
the budget were increased for a given group-program distribution. 
K = subgroup receiving trainees in a potential shift. 
L = subgroup from which trainees are being shifted. 
SG = shift of trainees from a smaller to a greater cost program. 
GS = shift of trainees from a greater to a smaller cost program. 
= proportion of group i in a subgroup D. Thus 
< - < 
4 ' 4Ï »1T 
Eyj^ = a shift not restricted by marginal adjusted cost. 
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Possible shifts: 
1. Primal to primal 
2. Primal to nonprimal 
3. Nonprimal to primal 
4. Nonprimal to nonprimal 
5. Primal to marginal 
6. Marginal to primal 
7. Nonprimal to marginal 
8. Marginal to nonprimal 
Some shifts are uninteresting because they clearly decrease the value 
of the solution. Shift from primal to nonprimal, marginal to nonprimal and 
primal to marginal are of this sort. Nonprimal to nonprimal shifts are 
irrelevant. 
The following algorithm is used to obtain the solution via the shift 
method. 
Procedure 
Step One - For a given budget and group-program distribution calculate a 
simplex optimum solution or select an optimum via a ranking. 
Step Two - Designate marginal and next marginal items. 
Step Three - Designate all interesting shifts. 
Step Four - Calculate the marginal cost adjustment constraints (See Table 
14). 
Step Five - Calculate E constraints from cost constraints (See Table 14). 
Step Six - Calculate maximum distribution shifts of E (See Table 14). 
Step Seven - Choose the smaller E and compute the associated AZp (Table 14). 
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Step Eight - Determine maximum AZp and shift. 
Step Nine - Repeat process until all AZp < 0, i.e., there are no more 
interesting shifts. 
Table 14. Calculation of C, E, AZ^^ 
A. Primal to primal 
1. Cost constraints 
S g - ' M S I  i  °  1  
"• Cgs • ^ 
' ''m " ^  
2. E constraints 
(CiT - C.y) 
b. E 
GS 
(l-PM)CM 
(Cij - CLy) 
c. E 
"NM 
GS 
(CiT - cIl) 
^UM ^i 
3. AZ, 0 < Pu 11 
a. AZ„ = 
B 
(-U)(C^y) ft (E)(4) 
It 
4 
+ (E)(C^2 - M 
iT T 
b. AZp = E (4 - «IT + (C iT 4) 
B: ,M 
T 
M ) 0 < i 1 
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Table 14. (Continued) 
gNM 
c. Substitute where appropriate. 
H, Nonprimal to primal 
1. Cost constraints 
"• CuM -
2. E constraints 
- "sg-'GS'-T- • 0 < 1 
iT 
"• - Si 
3. AZp 
a. AZp = E(C^,) -jA- - E(C^r) -j; ; 0 < < 1 
iT T 
K 'iT 4 
iT T 
C. Marginal to primal 
1. Cost and E constraints 
iT iT 
"•=" "^ .a, - i "iT < 
Table 14. (Continued) 
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L=M L=M L=M 
T i iT b. If E < E i.e.,E = Q < — ^ — 
max ^1 K 
iT 
(p" q" - c™) 
then E. > —— 
4 
and E 0%, > oj"»' - C™ 
2. AZ. 
P 
SL» * AZ_ (-Pf ^ Qif ) 
B 
L=M 
IT 
pL=M 
iT 
+ E 4 
2iT 
4 
: 4) C 
The algorithm is illustrated below for a five group - two program 
example problem. 
Table 15. Initial problem formulation 
Group Total cost Total benefits Distribution 
i OJT IT OJT IT OJT IT OJT IT 
1 1800 2400 3600 3600 2.0 1.5 .5 .5 
2 1000 1000 1300 1700 1.3 1.7 .5 .5 
3 500 150U 1500 1500 3.0 1.0 .9 .1 
4 1000 4000 1200 10000 1.2 2.5 .2 .8 
5 100 200 110 220 1.1 1.1 .4 .6 
Budget: $6000 
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The first step utilizes the simplex algorithm to reach an initial 
reasible solution. 
Maximize: ^ dIq ^i ^ i^ 
Subject to: Jq Q? pJ) = $6000 
0 < P° < 1 
The resultant solution is shown below: 
'2 - l-O - l i  "p = *13.425 
pO = 0 P2 = 1.0 M = $6,000 
P° = 1.0 P^ = 0 
P? = 0 P? = 1.0 
4 '4 
- 0 p= 
Table 16. Shift algorithm iterations 
Iteration One 
MM Group Shift P° Q° ^iT 
iT 
M 
NM 
10 
II 
20 
21 
30 
31 
40 
41 
50 
51 
None 
-10 
-21 
None 
None 
-30 
-41 
None 
None 
None 
1 
95/120 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
.5 1800 
2400 
.5 1000 
.5 
.9 
1000 
500 
.1 1500 
1000 
.8 4000 
.4 
. 6  
100 
200 
900 
950 
0 
500 
450 
0 
0 
3200 
0 
0 
3600 
3600 
1300 
1700 
1500 
1500 
1200 
10000 
110 
220 
2 . 0  
1.5 
1.3 
1.7 
3.0 
1.0 
1.2 
2.5 
1.1  
1.1 
Budget 6000 Value 13425 
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S GNP ^GS ^UM ^SG ^GS ®NP AZ 
1800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1425 950 250 0 0 0 0 95/180 .5 .5 440 
0 950 0 500 0 0 .5 0 0 0 100 
850 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 950 0 50 0 0 .1 0 0 0 75 
0 950 0 800 0 0 .2 0 0 0 800 
8000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 u 0 0 
Table 16. (Continued) 
Iteration Two 
MNM Group Shift P° qJ ^i^i^iT ^iT ^iT^^iT 
10 None 1 .5 1800 900 3600 2.0 
11 -10 15/120 .5 2400 150 3600 1.5 
20 -21 0 .5 1000 0 1300 1.3 
21 None 1 .5 1000 500 1700 1.7 
30 None 1 .9 500 450 1500 3.0 
31 -30 0 .1 1500 0 1500 1.0 
40 None 0 0 1000 0 1200 1.2 
41 None 1 1.0 4000 4000 10000 2.5 
50 None 0 .4 100 0 110 1.1 
51 None 0 .6 200 220 1.1 
Budget 6000 Value 14225 
^For ties choose the i with the highest and proceed. 
% 
1800 
225 
0 
850 
1350 
0 
0 
10000 
0 
0 
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^SGNP ^GS Vl ^SG ^GS ^NP ^MIN 
0  0 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0  
150 1050 0 0 0 0 15/180 .5 15/180 75 
150 0 0 0 0 15/100 0 .5 15/100 30 
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0  0 0  0 0  0  0 0 0 0  
150 0 0 0 0 0 .3 .1 .1 75^  
0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0  
0  0 0  0 0  0  0 0 0 0  
0  0 0  0 0  0  0 0 0 0  
0  0 0  0 0  0  0 0 0 0  
Table 16. (Continued) 
Iteration Three 
MNM Group Shif t iT 
M 
NM 
10 
II 
20 
21 
30 
31 
40 
41 
50 
51 
None 
-10 
-21 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
1 
10/120 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
.5 1800 
.5 2400 
.5 1000 
.5 
1 
0 
0 
1 
.4 
. 6  
1000 
500 
1500 
1000 
4000 
100 
200 
900 3600 
100 3600 
0 1300 
500 1700 
500 1500 
0 1500 
0 1200 
4000 10000 
0 
0 
110 
220 
2.0 
1.5 
1.3 
1.7 
3.0 
1.0 
1.2 
2.5 
1.1 
1.1 
Budget 6000 Value 14300 
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SGNP ^GS "SG ^GS ^NP ^IN AZ 
1800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
150 100 1100 0 0 0 0 10/180 .5 10/180 50 
0 100 0 0 0 0 .1 0 .5 .1 20 
850 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Table 16. (Continued) 
Iteration Four 
mm Group Shift P» 
10 None 1 10/18 1800 1000 3600 2.0 
NM II -10 0 8/18 2400 0 3600 1.5 
20 -21 0 .5 1000 0 1300 1.3 
M 21 None 1 .5 1000 500 1700 1.7 
30 None 1 1 500 500 1500 3.0 
31 None 0 0 1500 0 1500 1.0 
40 None 0 0 1000 0 1200 1.2 
41 None 1 1 4000 4000 10000 2.5 
50 None 0 .4 100 0 110 1.1 
51 None 0 .6 200 0 220 1.1 
Budget 6000 Value 14350 
142 
SGNP G^S U^M ®SG ®GS N^P M^IN 
2000 0000000000 
0 500 0 0 0 0 5/18 0 8/18 5/18 1^  
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
850 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1500 0000000000 
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
10000 0000000000 
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Table 16. (Continued) 
Iteration Five - Optimum 
MNM Group Shift 
iT it 
M 10 
II 
20 
21 
30 
31 
40 
41 
50 
51 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
1 15/18 1800 
0 3/18 2400 
0 .5 1000 
0 .5 1000 
1 1 500 
0 0 1500 
0 0 1000 
1 1 
.4 
. 6  
4000 
100 
200 
1500 3600 
0 3600 
0 1300 
0 1700 
500 1500 
0 1500 
0 1200 
4000 10000 
0 
0 
110 
220 
2 .0  
1.5 
1.3 
1.7 
3.0 
1.0 
1.2 
2.5 
1.1  
1.1  
Budget 6000 Value 14500 
•y/iT 
3000 
0 
0 
0 
1500 
0 
0 
10000 
0 
0 
AZ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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S GNP GS UM SG "GS Qi MIN 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The solution to the problem utilizing the shift algorithm is shown 
below: 
= 15/18 
P°Q° - 0 
'2 Sz - ° 
P° q: = 1 
- 0 
9% - 0 
FJqJ - 1 
P»Q° . 0 
f; S; = ° 
Budget = $6000 Optimum = $14,500 
The same problem is now formulated in terms of a simplex problem and 
solved using the simplex algorithm; 
Maximize; Z = 
Subject to; = M 
0 < P? + P^  < 1 
— i 1 — 
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Table 17 shows the iterations involved in the determination of the 
simplex optimum. 
Table 17. Entire simplex iterations 
OJT IT 
Basic P° 4 P° P° P° P^  P; P3 P4 P5 
A2 1 1 
A3 1 1 
A4 1 1 
S 
A. 1800 1000 500 1000 100 2400 1000 1500 4000 200 
6 
-Z -3600 -1300 -1500 -1200 -110 -3600 -1700 -1500 -10000 -220 
-W -1801 -1001 -501 -1001 -101 -2401 -1001 -1501 -4001 -201 
Work * 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Slack Artificial Obj ectivû 
Con­
stants Ratios 
*1 2^ 3^ \ R5 A^  Ag A^  A^  A, A, -Z -W 5 6 R 
1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1  1  1 1  
1 1 1 
1 6000 3/2 
1 0 
— 1 —1 —1 —1 —1 1 —6005 
00 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic P° P° P» P^  ^ P; P3 pi P5 
Al 1 1 
1 1 
A3 
p] 1 1 
4 
A^ 1 1 
A^  1800 1000 500 -3000 100 2400 1000 1500 0 200 
6 
-Z -3600 -1300 -1500 8800 -110 -3600 -1700 -1500 0 -220 
-W -1801 -1001 -501 3000 -101 -2401 -1001 -1501 0 -201 
Work * 
VD 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Con-
Slack Artificial Objective s tants Ratios 
^1 ^2 ^3 ^4 ^5 \ *2 A] A, A, -Z -W 5 5 \ R 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
-4000 -4000 1 2000 5/6  
10000 10000 1 10000 
-1 -1 -1 4000 -1 4001 1 -2004 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
6/24 -10/24 -5/24 30/24 -1/24 0 -10/24 -15/24 0 -2/24 
S 
1 
-Z 
18/24 10/24 5/24 -30/24 1/24 
-900 
10/24 15/24 
-W -6/24 
Work 
200 -750 13300 -40 . 0 -200 750 0 
-14/24 -19/24 -30/24 -23/24 0 -14/24 -9/24 0 
1 
2/24 
80 
-22/24 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Con­
Slack Artificial Objective stants Ratios 
R, R^  
*3 *4 S 4 Ag Ag A^ A, A, -Z -W D O \ R 
1 40/24 1 40/24 -1/2400 1/6 1/10 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
-40/24 -40/24 1/2400 5/6 <0 
16000 16000 36/24 1 13000 
-1 -1 —1 —40/24 -1 -40/24 2401/2400 1 -3 1/6 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
6/40 -10/40 -5/40 30/40 -1/40 0 -10/40 -15/40 0 -2/40 
-6/40 10/40 5/40 10/40 1/40 
1 0 0 0 0 
-Z -3300 4200 1250 1300 360 
—W 0 —1 —1 0 —1 
10/40 15/40 1 2/40 
0 0 
3800 6750 
-1 -1 
0 
880 
-1 
Work 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Slack Artificial Objective 
Con­
stants Ratios 
Ri R^  3^ 4^ s ^1 *2 A3 A^  A^  Ag —Z —W \ R 
24/40 1 24/40 1 -1/4000 4/40 -
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-24/40 0 -24/40 
1 
0 1/4000 
1 
36/40 
1 
3.6 
00 
1 0 1 0 G 1 CO 
-9600 0 -9600 0 4 1 11400 
0 -1 -1 0 -1 1 0 1 1 - -3 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
4 
1 
2 
3 
I 
4 
5 
I 
1 
-Z 
-w 
Work 
6/40 
-6/40 
1 
-3300 
-5/40 30/40 -1/40 
5/40 10/40 1/40 
400 1250 1300 360 
— 1 —1 
* 
-15/40 
15/40 
6750 
-1 
-2/40 
2/40 
880 
-1 
Table 17. (Continued) 
R, 
Slack 
R. R3 R^  R5 
Artificial 
Con-
Objective stants Ratios 
A3 A^  Ag -Z -W R 
24/40 10/40 24/40 10/40 -1/4000 14/40 
-24/40 -10/40 -24/40 -10/40 1/4000 26/40 26/5 
u> 
o 
-9600 -3800 
-1 
-9600 -3800 
- 1 1  1  
4 
1 
7600 
-2  
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
1 
-Z 
-W 
Work 
6/40 
-6/40 
1 
-3300 400 
30/40 -1/40 
10/40 1/40 
1 
1300 360 
-1 
-10/40 
10/40 
5500 
-2/40 
2/40 
880 
-1 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Con-
Slack Artificial Objective stants Rat: 
R2 Rg R^  R^  Ag A^  A^  A^  —Z —W b ^ R 
24/40 10/40 5/40 1 24/40 10/40 5/40 1 -1/4000 19/40 
1 1 1 CO 
1 1 1 
-24/40 -10/40 -5/40 -24/40 -10/40 -5/40 1/4000 21/40 
1  1  1 1  
1 1 1 
-9600 -3800 -1250 -9600 -3800 -1250 4 1 6350 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
4 
1 
2 
0 
3 
I 
4 
5 
I 
1 
-Z 
Work 
6/40 
-6/40 
1 
-3300 400 
30/40 -1/40 
10/40 1/40 
1 
1300 360 
-10/40 
10/40 
5500 
-2/40 
2/40 
880 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Slack 
R3 
Artificial 
Con-
Objective stants Ratios 
A3 A^  A^  -Z -W 
24/40 10/40 5/40 1 24/40 10/40 5/40 1 -1/4000 19/40 19/40 
-24/40 -10/40 -5/40 -24/40 -10/40 -5/40 1/4000 
1 
21/40 
1 
1 
o 
-7600 -3800 
* 
-1250 -9600 -3800 -1250 6350 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
S 
-Z 
Work 
6/24 
18/24 
-900 
* 
400 
30/24 -1/24 
-30/24 
13300 
1 
1/24 
-40 
-10/24 
10/24 
1500 
-2/24 
2/24 
80 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Slack Artificial 
Con-
Objective stants Ratios 
R-. R4 S -Z -W R 
10/24 5/24 40/24 19/24 19/6 
1 
1 
-10/24 -5/24 -40/24 5/24 5/18 
200 750 16000 13950 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
120/72 -4/72 -24/72 -40/72 -8/72 
1 
-Z 
Work 
400 
-30/18 1/18 24/18 
11800 10 1200 
10/18 
2000 
2/18 
180 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Slack 
Ri «2 
R3 R4 Rr 
Artificial 
2^ 3^ 4^ S 
Con-
Objective stants Ratios 
—Z —W R 
1 40/72 20/72 160/72 52/72 52/40 
-10/18 -5/18 -40/18 
-300 500 14000 
* 
1 
1 
1 
5/18 
14200 
Table 17. (Continued) 
OJT IT 
Basic 
R, 
2 
0 
3 
I 
4 
5 
0 
1 
-Z 
Work 
-40/72 
1 
1 10/18 
700 
120/72 -4/72 -24/72 -40/72 -40/72 
-30/18 1/18 24/18 10/18 10/18 
11800 10 1200 300 2000 
-8/72 
2/18 
180 
Table 17. (Continued) 
Slack 
Ri Rg R3 R4 R5 2^ 
Artificial 
Con-
Objective stants Ratios 
A^  A^  A^  Ag -Z —W b^  R 
20/72 160/72 12/72 
1 
-5/18 -40/18 
500 14000 
1 
1 
1 
15/18 
14500 
